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Perspectives from mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK 
on the development of China’s auditing firms: implications 




Based on gaining privileged access to interview senior representatives of audit firms, regulatory 
bodies, financial institutions, universities and other organizations in mainland China, Hong Kong 
and the UK, this exploratory study presents a range of informed views about the rapid 
development of China’s auditing profession over the last 25 years. It explores the emerging roles 
of the firms in the 2nd-tier international networks and among the larger stand-alone firms as 
challengers to the Big 4, nationally and internationally. It identifies national and international 
institutional interactions that have shaped and are being shaped by this rapid growth, with 
particular reference to the overarching role of the State’s shifting strategies to create a domestic 
profession in China that can compete internationally. The potential consequences, given China’s 
unequalled size and its expanding global influence, could change the nature and structure of the 
global profession. A significant contribution of this exploratory empirical study has been to 
deconstruct the continuing conventional political and academic rhetoric that dichotomizes firms 
into ‘foreign vs local’ and ‘Big 4 vs other’. It contributes new voices and alternative perspectives 
to the emerging literature on the glocalization of large professional services firms and suggests 




Chinese auditing profession; International Auditing Standards (ISA); Big 4; 2nd-tier 





Perspectives from mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK 
on the development of China’s auditing firms: implications 
and a research agenda 
 
1. Introduction  
Compared to knowledge about Western auditing firms there is relatively little 
knowledge about firms in China and how they differ (Suddaby et al., 2007; Empson et 
al., 2015). During the last 40 years or so the Chinese economy has been rapidly 
reinvented from being wholly state-planned to becoming today’s ‘socialist market 
economy’1 (its unique combination of market autonomy and techno-scientific 
administrative regulation under the Communist Party’s (CPC) overall direction), and 
it is already the second largest economy worldwide.2 This exploratory study analyses 
the history and consequences of the government initiatives in China to create, develop 
and regulate a profession of accountants and auditors holding the CICPA qualification. 
It recognises various national and international institutional changes with which these 
initiatives have interacted—including the translation into China of international 
accounting and auditing standards and the continuing rapid growth in China’s own 
stock-markets and in its international trade and investment. It suggests potential 
worldwide implications for the audit profession and opens up related auditing 
research issues. 
Whereas in the UK, for example, the Big 43 are so much larger than the others and 
dominate listed company audits (e.g. Bhaskar et al., 2019), in China the disparity is 
not so marked, as a significant number of non-Big 4 firms are licensed as auditors of 
companies listed on the huge domestic stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen), 
which include many State Owned Enterprises (SOE) where the government (including 
both the central and the various provincial governments) still holds the majority stake 
(e.g. Wong, 2014; Al-Natour et al., 2017). Some of these firms are also now licensed 
to audit companies listed in Hong Kong (see Appendix III). Could this provide the 
 
1 shèhuìzhǔyì shìchǎng jīngjì [社会主义市场经济]  
2 First if measured in purchasing power parity terms (ppp): 
http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php (accessed 14.2.2020) 
3 Since the 1990s the set of the largest international firms has gone from the ‘Big 6’, to the ‘Big 5’ to 
the ‘Big 4’ (referred to in Chinese as 四大 [sì dà]). Like Suddaby et al. (2007) this study generally 
uses this term even when the actual number was greater, unless the specific context requires a more 
exact usage. In China auditing firms are generally referred to as accounting firms since the 1995 
consolidation into one institute (see Figure 1) and in this study the terms are used interchangeably. 
 
2 
springboard for one or more of these firms to rival the dominance of the Big 4 not just 
in China but in auditing companies listed on other international stock exchanges? The 
Big 4 firms have themselves grown so rapidly in China that their offices there now 
match their staff numbers in the UK. Similarly for the other international networks, 
their Chinese offices are already, or are rapidly becoming, the largest. How could this 
affect the future development of these firms worldwide? 
To open up questions about how the ongoing changes in the hitherto mainly 
Anglo-American dominated—and studied—worldwide profession (e.g. Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007; Empson et al., 2015) might be further changed 
by rising Chinese influence, one therefore needs to explore a range of interlinked 
questions about how the newly-created Chinese profession has been rapidly 
developing since the ‘opening up’ ushered in by Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms 
(starting in 1978 and accelerating after 1992). There has been only 25 years 
experience, i.e. since 1995, of building a professional CICPA institute from ‘the top 
down’ against some 150 years of (mainly ‘bottom up’) development in the 
Anglo-American world.4 
The major English-language histories currently available are Li (2007) and Gillis 
(2014a).5 The former is a formal ‘official history’ by a former head of China’s 
National Audit Office [CNAO], while Gillis focuses primarily on charting how the 
Big 4 gained their market position inside China, drawing largely on a Marxist 
framework derived from Gramsci (1935/1971) and from the memoirs6 of the first 
Director-General of CICPA, Ding Pingzhun. He relates Ding’s continued attempts, up 
to his retirement in 1999 in the course of the WTO negotiations, to build up a strong 
Chinese profession as ‘counter-hegemonic’ to those perceived ‘foreign’ firms, 
focussing on his failed ‘dream’, after disaffiliating several leading firms from their 
 
4 Even since this research began research in 2011, while other leading countries have been virtually 
stagnating or even in recession, the Chinese economy has been rapidly growing even further: by 
November 2014 by about 37%, and by 2018 by about 80% 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (accessed 26.9.2019). 
5 Early stages are also reviewed in Hao, 1999 but overlooking the episode of the rival CICA (cf. 
Macve & Liu, 1995; Yee, 2012). See also 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201602/W020160218362809274905.pdf (accessed 1.10.17). 
6 Which Gillis (p.7) accuses of ‘often exhibiting an extreme bias’ (i.e. against the Big 4)—cf. Wen et 
al., 2018. Gillis (pp. vii; 270) himself equivocates on whether what he labels as the ‘hegemonic’ 
dominance of the Big 4 has overall been good or bad for China. 
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government/university sponsors, to merge them to create a Chinese ‘Big One’ (Gillis, 
2014a: 184-5;190).7  
This paper’s overall contribution to understanding the potential consequences of the 
rapid growth of the Chinese profession is quite simple, even though it may appear quite 
surprising to ‘Western’ eyes that have become accustomed to the neoliberal world order 
of the Washington consensus that underpins the current international dominance of the 
Big 4. It emphasises how accounting and audit firms in China remain subject, probably 
to an almost unique degree, to direction by a government that has a vision and a 
strategic plan for the role it wants them to play domestically and internationally (and in 
particular the members of the second-tier international networks and the leading 
stand-alone firms). There are no such strategies in the US or UK. Given the sheer size 
of the firms in China (again almost unique and which is still rapidly growing) it seems 
inevitable that this will alter the balance of the structure, management and culture of the 
current leading firms worldwide and may also alter the structure and processes of 
international regulation and standard setting. Indeed, the government has a 
longstanding aim (as explored in the paper) for a recognizably ‘Chinese’ firm or firms 
to join the current international leaders and become a ‘Big N’ firm.  
However, the path the government is pursuing has to navigate the various 
institutional structures that it has to try to influence but that may in turn reshape it. 
These include, inter alia, developments in domestic and international markets, 
developments in domestic and international stock exchanges and other arenas of 
financial infrastructure, developments in transnational regulation and in varying 
third-party liability regimes, developments in links with universities and other 
professional bodies, and ongoing changes internationally in the challenges facing the 
current leading international professional services firms (IPSFs). There are also 
contested agendas within the government itself. 
For researchers this means that, on China’s present trajectory, work that deepens 
understanding of auditing in China will be significant for understanding the ways in 
which the global profession and global standards are increasingly being reshaped. This 
work will be vital if we are to more fully explain the changes that occur and make 
meaningful comparisons and contrasts with developments in other countries and 
 
7 Gillis (an American former PwC partner in China now on the faculty of Peking University) also 
draws on some correspondence and undocumented interviews, apparently mainly with those who have 




worldwide (and some potential avenues for exploration are outlined in Section 6.1). 
As called for by Gillis (2014a: 302), this study therefore broadens the histories 
given by Gillis and by Li (2007) by exploring in greater depth the roles of the 2nd-tier 
networks and of stand-alone Chinese firms in developing their reputations and 
markets, and their interrelationships with the State’s continuing proactive strategies 
nationally and internationally; and by looking beyond mainland China to understand 
international perceptions of the developments there and their possible implications. 
The major innovative features of this study have been, first, the privileged access 
given to interview a wide range of very senior auditors, regulators, academics and 
others in mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK over several years; and, second, 
that the study has benefitted from collaboration between two interviewers with 
contrasting UK (Macve) and Chinese (Deng) backgrounds. These complementary 
perspectives have enabled a fuller understanding of the many internal contradictions 
that China and its audit firms face. Although the resulting interpretations necessarily 
often remain tentative, the attempt is important as the developments in China have 
potentially worldwide ramifications, given China’s size and continuing rapid growth 
and influence. 
This, primarily descriptive and exploratory, study therefore assembles a wide range 
of expert voices in building an understanding of the current Chinese situation and 
possible future developments. The outcome may in turn suggest a need for 
re-interpreting currently theorized understandings of the roles and power of 
international professional service firms (IPSFs) (cf. Gillis et al., 2014; Empson et al., 
2015).  
A significant contribution from the empirical investigation has been to deconstruct 
the continuing conventional political and academic rhetoric that dichotomizes firms 
into ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ and into ‘Big 4’ and ‘other’ and to show how changes in 
China itself as a consequence of ‘opening up’—including not only the re-creation of 
an accounting and auditing profession but also the more general expansion of higher 
education after the repression of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76,8 together with 
revolutions in the ‘mindsets’ of successive generations exposed to the changing forms 
of symbolic, cultural and social capital engineered by the State (cf. Smart, 
 
8 which some of the interviewees had lived through. 
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1993)—have shaped the spectrum of interrelationships of homegrown Chinese firms 
with the Big 4 and, more recently, with the 2nd-tier international audit firm networks. 
Section 2 briefly sets out some major features of the institutional environment 
within which the Chinese profession has developed and outlines the theoretical lens 
through which we have chosen to view them.  
Section 3 covers the history since end of the Mao era when all accounting and 
auditing had been part of the centrally planned economy (as it had been in Communist 
Russia—Mennicken, 2008; 2010) and outlines three main stages in the development 
of the current profession and the growth of the audit markets in China. Section 4 
explores some key background cultural elements in understanding the context of these 
rapid developments; and Section 5 evaluates the present situation and its possible 
future trajectories.9 In the light of the empirical material from the interviews / 
conversations undertaken,10 a tentative understanding is offered of the major national 
and international institutional factors currently shaping the profession that have led to 
the changing position of the Big 4 relative to homegrown firms, including both those 
that have joined the 2nd tier international networks and some large stand-alone 
Chinese CPA firms (see Appendix III). And even while the current Big 4 retain their 
worldwide dominance as IPSFs they, like the other firms, seem likely to reflect 
significant organizational changes in the balance of their management structure and 
control as the preponderance of their Chinese member firms accelerates. 
Section 6 concludes and suggests some potential future research avenues that arise 
from the findings of this study’s initial explorations of experts’ perceptions in 
mainland China, Hong Kong and the UK. 
 
2. Theoretical approach to mapping the institutional background  
Neo-institutional theory seeks to link changes in culture and beliefs, in institutions, in 
 
9 This paper generally reflects information obtained by the end of November 2014, with some selective 
updates from publicly available sources up to the end of 2019. It was set up before the recent 
counterchallenges to China’s rise that have been deployed by the Trump administration in the US but 
which, among others, the UK and several other European countries appear reluctant to endorse. 
(Despite the US efforts, China’s economy still reportedly grew by over 6% in 2019 as compared to the 
US (2.3%) and the UK (1.2%): 
http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp-growth.php (accessed 20.1.2020).) It 
also predates the recent political turbulence in Hong Kong and the outbreak of Covid-19. 
10 Details of how we collected the interview material and other empirical data underlying our 
interpretation of the Chinese developments, and of how interviewees’ roles are coded in quotations, are 




organizations, and in individuals’ discourses and practices (e.g. Lounsbury and Zhao, 
2013). Suddaby and Muzio (2015) trace the development, building on Abbott (1988; 
2005), of a general ‘ecological-institutional’ theory of organizational change as a 
helpful lens through which to analyse the transnational growth and regulation of 
IPSFs. On the partial analogy of biological ecosystems and their subsystems and how 
their internal and external linkages co-evolve (competitively or symbiotically; tending 
to equilibria or disequilibria) the theory focuses on the professions as subsystems of 
institutional ecosystems and on their co-evolving internal and external linkages (but 
differing from biological evolution in recognising human agency throughout).  
As an example, Mennicken (2008, 2010), investigates the introduction and 
implementation of international auditing standards [ISAs] in post-Soviet Russia, 
replacing the traditional state audit mentality and procedures ‘as it faces up to the 
challenges of international harmonisation’. She focuses on the ‘connecting worlds’ of 
the networked interrelations of the various actors and other factors involved in the 
development and conceptualisation of fields and arenas of institutional activity that 
comprise ever-changing ‘linked ecologies’.  
As Suddaby and Muzio (2015, p.39) summarize, one is looking at how far the 
processes of institutional work result in stability or disequilibrium, and in an 
environment of competition or symbiosis with other institutions, to attempt ‘to 
understand the dynamic interaction between professions and other social institutions 
and how these mutually inform, reinforce, and complement each other’. 
There are significant differences between the trajectory of the changes in Russia 
and in China (e.g. Harrison and Ma, 2013) and this study therefore explores how 
significant institutional roles and their (self)conceptualizations among China’s newly 
created auditing professionals and their firms have been rapidly changing and 
interacting with their changing connections—both within China and in their 
international linkages—with a changing constellation of linked actors and forces. As 
illustrated below, these ‘linked ecologies’ include most importantly the State, i.e. the 
Chinese government controlled by the CPC, which continues as the most significant 
actor both within China and in developing China’s international roles. Within China it 
directs accounting and auditing development and shapes its changing interactions with 
other arenas and fields, primarily through its direction of higher education and 
 
7 
through the (sometimes conflicting) mediation of MoF, CSRC and CICPA11 and their 
vigorous promotion of mergers and ‘localization’ of audit firms, of development of 
these firms’ NAS skills, and of their convergence with IFRS and IAS, alongside the 
enhancement of corporate governance practices in their client companies.  
Internationally it frames Chinese accounting institutions’ international relations, 
especially through increased influence within IASB and IAASB and its promotion of 
integration with Hong Kong’s profession and stock market. Its relations with overseas 
professional accounting bodies, together with its encouragement to CICPA firms to 
integrate with international professional networks of audit firms overseas, 
complement its encouragement and support of the expansion of Chinese overseas 
investment (for example recently through the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative)12 and of 
strengthening China’s wider global influence in an increasing variety of arenas. In 
turn these emerging linkages and influences have served to shape and reshape the 
government’s own agendas.  
However, one must also recognise (as analysed further in Sections 4 and 5) 
continuing potential barriers to integration within the prevailing neo-liberal world 
order and its institutions, resulting from the underlying ‘Chinese characteristics’ of a 
culture of control and guānxì, alongside the continuing strength of the different 
incentive structures around and within the domestic SOEs in the economy (e.g. Wang 
et al., 2008) and some growing political antipathy to ‘Western values’. There are also 
complex interrelationships between different organs of the State including the relative 
spheres of the central and provincial governments, and of a range of ministries, as 
well as of the ‘rule of law’ that is exercised primarily as an administrative arena of the  
government and Party.13 On the other hand, the growth of the Chinese economy has 
been so rapid over the last 40 years of the ‘reform and open’ policy that there have 
been accompanying intergenerational transformations in education levels and cultural 
 
11 The CICPA remains ‘under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance [MoF] and the Council’: 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/introcicpa/about/201407/t20140708_45449.html (accessed 14.2.20). The State 
Council is the chief administrative authority of the PRC, chaired by the Premier. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has the status of a ministry and reports to the Premier. 
(See Appendix II.) 
12https://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/technical-activities/technical-resources-search/2017/july/the-belt-a
nd-road-initiative-.html ; http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/ (accessed 19.09.2018).  
13 Brandt et al. (2014) point out that under the Emperors, as now, the dispensation of law was 
primarily a responsibility of the administration (central and/or local), rather than of an independent 
judiciary so there is a different understanding of what is meant by the ‘rule of law’ (e.g. Feuchtwang & 
Steinmüller (2017), Chapter 16). However, one of our most senior UK interviewees commented that 
the settlement of commercial disputes nowadays through arbitration is very efficient [4RGL, pp.22-4]. 
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values that will continue to shape and reshape successive generations’ orientation to 
and influence on China’s international roles.14 
As well as the Chinese State there are other significant market and regulatory 
arenas with which China’s accounting developments have been rapidly co-evolving, 
including the huge stockmarkets in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong; the 
increasing presence of the international networks of auditing and accounting firms 
and their educational and training provision to China’s new auditors (e.g. Stuttard, 
2009); the import of international accounting and auditing standards alongside 
Western models of professional bodies; and the impact from cross-listings of Chinese 
companies on overseas stock exchanges (especially in the US) following IPOs both of 
giant SOEs (especially banks and energy companies) and of private start-ups 
(especially new technology companies) with resulting interactions with overseas 
national regulators. China’s development of its auditing profession has also brought 
about changes in these arenas as well as being influenced by them. This study 
therefore necessarily sets out to open up a range of ‘linked ecologies’, national and 
international, and the interactions between them as a basis for more specifically 
focussed questions for future research. 
Probably the outstanding feature of the Chinese environment is the remarkable 
speed with which these changes have taken—and are still taking—place. Within this 
interactive framework the study seeks to deconstruct the political and academic 
rhetoric that adopts the anachronistic dichotomies of continuing to label the 
accounting and auditing firms as ‘foreign / Chinese’, or as ‘Big 4 / the rest’, and to 
relate the changes in these Chinese institutions to world-wide changes in the 
‘connecting worlds’ of IPSFs (e.g. Suddaby et al., 2007; Empson et al., 2015). 
3. Stages in the development of the Chinese profession 
Broadly three stages of development can be traced: first, from 1978 laying the 
foundations by bringing in foreign expertise; second from 1995 building a unified 
profession and developing the capability to challenge foreign competitors; third (and 
currently) turning the foreign competitors into ‘Chinese’ firms. This government 
strategy has broadly matched the ambitions of the UK-American firms themselves, 
especially the Big 4, as their strategy worldwide has generally been to establish a 
 
14 See e.g. Brandt et al. (2014) and Feuchtwang & Steinmüller (2017) for comprehensive reviews of 
recent developments in China and their historical economic, political and cultural roots. 
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presence that is initially managed by expatriates (who are expensive to maintain and 
compensate), but with the longer-term aim of ‘naturalizing’ / ‘localizing’ the firm to 
be run by local nationals, a process which would normally require some 20-30 years 
or more of building up sufficient numbers of sufficiently experienced local partners 
who, as far as possible, have acquired sufficient ‘tacit’ knowledge and internalized the 
firm’s culture (e.g. Stuttard, 2009; Faulconbridge, 2015: 428-9). 
 
3.1 Stage 1: Laying the foundations 
Following the centrally planned economy of the Mao era, from 1978 the ‘reform and 
opening’ of China under Deng Xiaoping introduced a new vertical alignment of 
economic incentives from top to bottom (Brandt et al., 2014, p.9). As the ideology of 
the new approach was being worked out within a continuing Communist political 
framework (e.g. Gewirtz, 2017), the Chinese audit profession had to be (re)created 
from scratch (e.g. Yee, 2012), so it required international support, including provision 
of advice, training and also overseas experience, primarily in the UK and US, to 
selected young recruits. A senior Chinese professor, also involved in regulation, 
commented: 
Li Yong, who is the chairman now -- current chairman [of CICPA].15 He's also the Deputy 
Minister of the Ministry of Finance at this time still. He is one of four -- I, myself -- the other 
one is the chairman of Ernst & Young -- still Chinese joint venture. And still the other one is 
former deputy secretary general of the CICPA. Four of us went to US in 1981. The first batch of 
people. Then second group go to Coopers & Lybrand and third group go to the other accounting 
firms. [16JSM, p.7] 
 
To stimulate technology transfer into the ‘reformed and opened’ economy, many 
licenses to foreign companies wanting to establish subsidiaries in China were 
originally only granted if they established Sino-foreign ‘joint ventures’ (JV) between 
the overseas company and a Chinese partner (e.g. Dai, 2011). Correspondingly their 
audits were required to be conducted by (normally) their overseas group auditor 
working together with a local Chinese audit firm. And so the leading accounting firms, 
and in particular those that still survive as the Big 4 today, who had begun entering 
China through representative offices in the 1980s, were given special permission to 
 
15 Subsequently succeeded by Feng Shuping from October 2014: 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/leaders/xhldcy/201410/t20141028_46007.html (accessed 6.1.15) 
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establish their own Sino-foreign JVs with local firms for 20 years starting in 1992 and 
were required to provide education and training more widely (e.g. Stuttard, 2009).  
The local firms were then still all owned by government-sponsored entities and 
often consisted of just a sole practitioner CPA, for example a university professor or 
former MoF or state-audit (CNAO) employee. The JV provided a legal structure to 
allow foreign partners to be the auditors of Chinese companies. (The disaffiliation of 
all Chinese accounting/audit firms from their sponsoring state organisations was 
finally completed only in 1999—see Figure 1 which highlights some key 
developments among the national and international actors.) 
 
*****Insert Figure 1 about here***** 
 
In the view of a leading Chinese Big 4 practitioner (who had been one of the first 
cohort of students re-admitted to university after the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) 
and had also been on such an overseas visit in 1985) at this stage China was just 
‘feeling its way’, for example in how to set up the initial JVs with the major 
international firms. 
…so a lot of time, just like -- I don’t know if you know there was a famous saying from 
Deng Xiaoping, called ‘touch the stone when you cross the river’16…So, we only do the start 
and then we found some new issues and then we start to solve those issues and go further. So, 
it’s things like that, for example…So, that’s something we didn’t realize until you need to go the 
next step. [114BM]17 
 
In many countries mergers with substantial local firms have secured the aim of 
becoming established there but in China such firms were still only embryonic and 
early attempts along this path by the Big 4 were often unsuccessful and were 
abandoned (cf. Gillis, 2014a: 198-202). Indeed, what is now perceived as one of the 
biggest wholly stand-alone Chinese firms, ShineWing, actually originated within 
Coopers & Lybrand and only became separate at the time of the 1998 merger that 
created PwC (Stuttard, 2009; cf. Gillis, 2014a: 185; 212).  
Developing this intellectually-based service capacity in China has been more 
difficult than developing the manufacturing-based capabilities that have characterised 
most of China’s boom, and has been more difficult than in many other countries, 
because it had to begin with a generation of young people who had been deprived of 
 
16 A widely used expression for China’s pragmatic gradualism: mōzhe shítou guòhé [摸着石头过河]. 
17 Other Big 4 firms were often also ‘feeling their way’ e.g. Stuttard, 2009 cf. Cooper et al., 1998. 
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normal higher education opportunities, as their families had often been banished to 
work in the countryside during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, for 
developing accounting the biggest problem was that before 1978 there had been about 
30 years in the planned economy, established since the founding of the PRC, when 
there had been no need for CPAs and for accounting / audit firms (Ezzamel et al., 
2007). So unlike in many other countries, there was no pre-existing local profession to 
be swamped by the new foreign tide of globalization. 
Yee (2012) explores how there were originally rival institutes, one (CICPA) 
sponsored by the Ministry of Finance and one (CICA) by the state audit organizations 
at national (China’s National Audit Office [CNAO]) and provincial levels. They were 
unified into today’s CICPA under the initiative of Vice-Premier (later Premier) Zhu 
Rongji in 1995.18  
 
3.2 Stage 2 The new CICPA builds the unified profession to develop the capability 
to challenge foreign competitors 
 
Wang Jun became Director of the Accounting Regulatory Department of MoF in 1987 
and rose to be Vice-Minister of Finance from 2005 to 2013. He was Deputy 
Secretary-General of CICPA in 1993-4.19 As one interviewee commented:  
The CICPA is actually very much based on the ICAEW model because Dr. Wang Jun actually 
set up the CICPA. He actually spent time in England and he is now an honorary member of the 
ICAEW20…He actually modelled the whole arrangement on the ICAEW, so it’s very similar. 
And there’s still this ongoing programme between the CICPA and the ICAEW. [32TL, p.23]21 
 
The choice of ICAEW as a model with its history of UK-American ‘bottom-up’ 
evolution of the profession (rather than say the Japanese or French institutes which 
are more creations of the state) probably indicates how China viewed the importance 
in international political terms at the time of being seen to be becoming a member of 
the international Anglophone financial community alongside the leading Western 
countries. (There was also the precedent of the long-established Hong Kong Institute 
 
18 For a contemporaneous analysis of the issues see Macve and Liu, 1995. 
19 http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Wang_Jun%7C2842/career [accessed 23.11.2014]. 
20 
http://www.icaew.com/en/archive/about-icaew/newsroom/press-releases/2009-press-releases/chine
se-vice-minister-of-finance-receives-icaew-honorary-membership-168932 [accessed 21.7.14]. 
21 The ‘ongoing programme’ now allows Chinese CPAs to add the ICAEW qualification by taking 
some additional steps 
https://www.icaew.com/membership/becoming-a-member/members-of-other-bodies/members-of-ot
her-bodies-a-z (accessed 29.1.19). 
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of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA).)22 
The rapid development now needed as markets developed was supported by 
massive State investment in accounting training, both in the newly revitalised 
universities, which from the 1980s had begun to offer accounting degrees, and also 
when in 2002 (on the advice of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore) Premier 
Zhu Rongji oversaw the creation of three huge ‘National Accounting Institutes’ under 
the MoF, in Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen, which still continue to provide training on 
a large scale for a wide range of accounting and auditing work (Suzuki et al., 2007).  
China joined the WTO in December 2001 with two consequences. Its new 
domestic audit profession would potentially have more access overseas, 
accompanying Chinese enterprises’ own cross-border expansion (e.g. Reich & Lebow, 
2014, Chapter 4). But also, as inhibitions on foreign firms would have to be relaxed, 
that domestic profession would need further strengthening if it was not to be swamped 
by the ‘foreign’ dominance of the Big 4 and other international firms as FDI poured in 
and giant Chinese SOEs and other major companies sought listings on US and other 
overseas capital markets, for which Big 4 advice and certification was an essential 
requirement. 
 
3.2.1 Mergers—and their risks 
A series of government policies to build up the profession, in the context of the 
increasing competition, directly resulted in a bottom-up merger tide within the 
domestic CPA industry from 2000 that has been continuing ever since. At first these 
mergers were partially compulsorily mandated by CICPA but after 2005 ‘soft’ 
persuasion’ was driven by exhortation from CICPA to embrace market opportunities. 
However, the mergers brought their own problems, at least initially (Gillis, 2014b, 
p.68), as often elsewhere in the world (e.g. Empson & Langley, 2015: 172-4; 
Mawdsley & Somaya, 2015: 225-7). This study’s interviewees were asked to 
comment on apparent evidence from quantitative research in China (for example 
Deng, 2011) that these sometimes hastily ‘arranged marriages’ had led to an initial 
weakening of risk control within the firms and an increase in audit risks in the 
acquisition of new clients such that ‘bigger’ might not mean ‘better’. A former senior 
regulator commented:  
 
22 Hong Kong had remained a British colony until it was returned to China in 1997. 
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They [were] really created by the government, not mergers acquired them by themselves....This 
target not set up by yourself. It's a target by others. Just like your parents force you to get 
married to this girl no matter you like or not....So, in this generation if you really want to get the 
firm to become bigger and bigger, get the firm [to] become a very lot organized, and can meet 
the demand of these complicated business developments... [W]e have some -- several cases 
which show that these mergers is not a good foundation -- not just because the culture is 
different, just because the management competence is not sufficient to suddenly become a big 
firm. How can they control handling the daily management business? How can they handle 
some firm -- some office in other cities? How can they control the quality of those offices in 
doing some complicated, risky clients? So, this cause a lot of problems. Also, how internally to 
govern these people as a family -- focusing on the quality not just focus on the money. So this is 
a quite difficult issue faced by those big firms because they have to merge. [16RGM, p6ff] 
 
This study’s interviewees in audit firms were in larger firms that had generally 
resulted from mergers, as they generally have around the world, or were still growing 
that way, and the others were generally involved with listed companies who also used 
the bigger firms. So, perhaps not surprisingly, the overall view expressed was that, 
despite the difficulties of integrating risk control and quality procedures etc., this 
growth was necessary to meet clients’ own expansion and to support the technical 
infrastructure for keeping up with and training staff in international accounting and 
auditing standards, for handling regulatory requirements etc. and for essential IT 
investment (e.g. Lombardi et al., 2015), as well as for creating a marketable brand.23  
However, some academics’ doubts remained, e.g.: 
So now Chinese audit firms have a clever way to merge. They are separate firms in a law 
sense…So if one has a problem [it] will not influence the head office…So when they become 
one firm, they summarise their annual accounts together, but if one of them get penalised, get 
law suits, they will keep it to themselves. No business of others…So it’s impossible for them to 
keep the same quality as they don’t have the incentives to improve the quality after such a kind 
of merger. [15JSM p.11] 
 
The rapid growth in the Chinese economy means also that potential new clients are 
always appearing and some could be very risky. All the firms have procedures for 
vetting clients and believe they can match their approach to the risks involved in those 
they take on. For example a senior Chinese Big 4 partner commented:  
I think you take the clients that are more risky -- we take the company with high risk as a client 
as well. I think it’s more of a business decision, as long as you know it’s something that’s 
manageable. Or you can be better protected…you still take the high risk clients but you [have] 
got to have the procedures in place to manage those risks. [11B4M p.80] 
 
So the risk control procedures of China’s indigenous audit firms are still maturing and 
catching up with the international firms (Deng, 2011) and the problems that they face 
are similar to some of the obstacles previously faced by the Big 4 on the path of their 
 
23 Gong et al. (2016) offer evidence (based on information reported by merged firms to the CICPA) of 
improved efficiencies resulting from mergers. 
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own earlier international development. How to balance the risks and benefits of taking 
on both new partner firms, as well as new clients, is crucial as this is what will decide 
whether the expanded firm could survive the fierce competition for status and be 
rewarded with a good reputation. 
 
3.2.2 ‘Document 56’  
In 2009, MoF and CICPA, published their most ambitious targets yet for the Chinese 
profession.24 The first target aimed to establish a tiered structure of ‘10-200-7000’ 
firms, of which the largest 10 would be in a superleague of audit firms with 
multinational operations that could service large complex companies and potentially 
rival the worldwide international audit firms.25 Although the government was no 
longer pursuing Ding’s original dream to rival them through merger of the leading 
firms to create a wholly Chinese ‘Big One’, Wang Jun, as Vice-Minister of Finance, 
had already declared: 
 
‘Arm yourself with international thinking, international strategies and the spirit of 
international exploration. Aim to become the champion of accountancy who will one day be 
able to sign and issue audit reports for worldwide enterprises on the New York, London, 
Tokyo and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges.’26 
 
The second target was to extend the service range of audit firms to include various 
non-audit consulting services (NAS); and the third, to improve the auditing 
environment (including the adoption of international accounting and auditing 
standards). Over the next few years there would be further developments in the 
corporate governance of listed companies; modifications in the nature of regulatory 
oversight and government influence; and changes in the auditor appointment process 
including new requirements for audit rotation. LLP status was imposed on audit firms 
(although in the event the structure finally required was the ‘Special General 
Partnership’ (SGP) imposing liability on individually responsible audit partners);27 
 
24 Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of China’s CPA Industry 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-10/12/content_18686725.htm (in Chinese: accessed 
29.1.2019) 
25 Cf. Appendix I where the 2011-15 target was: ‘Develop 10 world-class firms, at least three [of] which 
will rank among the world's top 20 firms….’. 
26 From a speech by Wang Jun at the Inaugural Ceremony of the CPA Leadership Training Session, 
May 20, 2006 (reprinted as Chapter 4 in Wang, 2010). 
27 Wang & Dou (2015) offer some evidence that the increased personal liability of partners under the 
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and there were measures to further enhance CPAs’ professional competence. 
Meanwhile CSRC held out the ‘carrot’ of licenses to audit companies listed on 
China’s stock exchanges but only if firms could meet its qualifying criteria. As a 
result of mergers, the number of audit firms with such licenses for providing 
securities-related services decreased from 105 in 2002 to 40 in 2014. 
 
3.2.3 Translation and development of IAS and ISA 
Before 1978, accounting and financial reporting in China had been mainly designed to 
assist macro-economic planning and control over productive units. Accounting 
regulations were promulgated in the form of an ‘accounting rule’, a centrally 
determined manual with detailed, rigid journal entry requirements and a prescribed 
reporting format (Zhou, 1998). 
For the development of market-oriented accounting and auditing standards, China 
had obtained advice from Big 4 firms and international professional bodies, alongside 
funding from the World Bank, and having moved through various interim stages 
following the initial issue of Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) in 1992 (Gillis 
2014a: 219; cf. Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015), ‘on 15 February 2006, MoF formally 
announced the issuance of the long awaited revised Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises (ASBE)28 which comprised a new Basic Standard and 38 
Specific ASBEs. These…cover nearly all of the topics…[in] the current International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)…and [are] mandatory for listed Chinese 
enterprises from 1 January 2007. Other Chinese enterprises are also encouraged to 
apply them. These standards are substantially in line with IFRSs, except for certain 
modifications which reflect China’s unique circumstances and environment’ (Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2006).29 The intention to converge completely with IFRS was 
announced.30 In parallel, China achieved full convergence with international auditing 
standards (ISA) with effect from 2011.31  
 
change from limited company to LLP form increased their risk aversion to signing off on more 
aggressive reported earnings. 
28 qĭyè kuàijìzhŭnzé [企业会计准则]. 
29 The remaining differences primarily relate to fair values, treatment of impairments and disclosures 
of ‘related party’ transactions (before IASB changed IAS24) and MoF and the Chairman of IASB 
signed a memorandum on November 8 2005 that, subject to these exceptions, these revised ASBEs 
are substantially in convergence with IFRS. Cf. Nobes (2019). 
30 For the ‘Roadmap of continuous convergence between China Accounting Standards and IFRS’ 




With the appointment from 2007 of a Chinese board member of IASB (and other 
international appointments—see Appendix II) China has begun to have reciprocal 
influence over IFRS and other international standards that will take account of 
China’s own situation (Upson, n.d.; Macve, 2014). As a leading UK regulator 
commented: 
I mean it’s been very striking, and actually quite impressive, the way that Chinese 
representatives on the international bodies have embraced their involvement with the 
international bodies, and the quality of their participation. [4RGL pp.2-3] 
 
3.2.4 NAS 
A major aspect of the worldwide growth of the Big 4 and other international networks 
has been the extension of their activity beyond auditing to offering a wide range of 
professional services, particularly management consulting services (including taxation 
and IT services) (e.g. Barrett & Hinings, 2015) and so becoming IPSFs. In the 
Chinese context CICPA included encouragement in Document 56 of 2009 for the 
Chinese firms to grow in this direction too in order to compete domestically and 
internationally, which is likely to increasingly raise issues such as how far its 
regulatory control should extend beyond the core auditing activity and potentially 
similar issues about maintaining audit independence to those that have increasingly 
been debated in the US and Europe (e.g. Zeff, 2003; Gwilliam, et al., 2014). (This is 
discussed further in Section 5.1(6).) 
 
3.3 Stage 3: ‘Localization’ to turn the ‘foreign competitors’ into ‘Chinese’ firms 
In 2012 the initial arrangements—whereby to sign audit reports in mainland China the 
Big 4 firms had to form a joint venture (JV) with a Chinese auditing firm, that was 
normally still affiliated to a government ministry or a university (e.g. Aiken et al., 
1997)—expired. The Government now allowed the Big 4 firms to continue practising 
on condition that they ‘localized’ more rapidly than they had been planning to do 
themselves. While the firms argued that the localization trend would continue 
‘automatically’ as it is driven by market forces (as in other areas of the world) they 
wanted it to follow the natural timescale it takes for people to become experienced 
enough to be trusted with the most senior positions. But CICPA and MoF wished to 
accelerate the change, in order that all partners who sign off on Chinese company 
 
https://www.ifac.org/news-events/2010-11/chinese-auditing-standards-board-and-international-au
diting-and-assurance-standa (accessed 29.1.2019) 
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audits are subject to CICPA regulation and discipline, and for this purpose—given the 
continuing maintenance of ‘one country, two systems’32 for at least 50 years (i.e. until 
at least 2047)—those partners originating from Hong Kong who have only the 
HKICPA qualification do not yet count as indigenous Chinese CPAs.  
In the 2012 MoF announcements, the ‘localization’ conditions required that by 
December 31, 2017 the firms could only have up to 20% ‘foreign partners’, i.e. with 
overseas qualifications but not the CICPA qualification, with at least ten years of 
experience, and with at least five years experience in China. The management 
committee could not have more than 20% ‘foreigners’ without the CICPA 
qualification and after 2015 the chairman/managing partner must be a Chinese 
national and a Chinese CPA.33 
The argument over the speed of change is at one level an argument about the 
balance between ‘explicit knowledge’ (obtainable through examinations, studying 
IFRS etc.) and ‘tacit knowledge’ (knowing how to judge the appropriate application 
of explicit knowledge in differing and changing circumstances, which requires the 
‘wisdom’ of experience) (e.g. Faulconbridge, 2015: 428-9). But the MoF also see it as 
a political issue of professional status and this guideline demonstrates its resolute 
promotion of CICPA’s qualification.  
Existing partners who currently only have overseas certificates could remain in 
their post after the transition if they gain CICPA’s qualification. Many such partners, 
including the managing partners, came from Hong Kong, and the current exemption 
policy between HKICPA and CICPA, since December 2010, has made it much easier 
for both sides’ members to get the other’s qualification.34 But the examination 
requirements remain a barrier to the older generation who are familiar with English 
and (mainly spoken) Cantonese and not with writing in the simplified characters used 
on the mainland for writing in Mandarin.35  
As our top-level CICPA interviewee commented (in 2011): 
Not only today but in the future we need resources from Big 4 but I’m sure that local partners of 
Big 4 are ready to run the Big 4 in China. [9PBM, p.9] 
 
Would this also help the more locally based firms, e.g. those in the 2nd-tier networks, 
 
32 yī guó liǎng zhì [一国两制] http://www.info.gov.hk/info/sar5/e12.htm (accessed 29.1.2019). 
33 MoF May 2nd 2012 Document #8: (财会[2012] 8号) [in Chinese] 
34 22.12.2010 [in Chinese]: http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2010-12/22/c_13660384.htpm 
(accessed 14th May 2012). 
35 Also all audit working papers have to be kept in (Mandarin) Chinese to facilitate regulatory 
inspections (Gillis, 2014a:147; confirmed in interview by 25B4M). 
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to break the mould? One view from London (in 2011) was:  
[T]he fact that the JV arrangements, which are coming to an end, a lot of the mid-tier firms 
believe it’s an opportunity. I’m a bit more cynical about that because I don’t underestimate the 
Big 4. One thing they’ve been doing and boy, do we feel it, is they’ve been sucking up local 
talent, so that in the JV, all that’s going to happen to them is they won’t be a JV anymore. 
They’ll be an indigenous firm, called [one of the Big 4] and they’ll be full of indigenous 
experienced, trained accountants, here to improve their core system. [32TL p4] 
 
Big 4 firms in China had seen the problem differently, fearing adverse consequences 
from over-hasty changes at the top. As a senior (mainland Chinese) partner 
interviewed in 2011 commented: 
Maybe I’m an old person. I’m not really fast. I don’t trust the fast growing. I think everything - 
they have their own natural pace; you have to nurture them. You cannot just turn them around 
overnight. If you do that, it only just make a damage of---So, I think the localization is a trend 
but definitely you cannot just push, especially a push by the government, because they don’t run 
the firm. They don’t know all of the operations. They start to attack Big 4 saying they should be 
local. I think -- my belief -- I believe that the localization is not how many local firms you make, 
[or] you make them big; actually the quality is more important--in order to do that, you have to 
have a healthy environment, have a regulated or fair, competitive environment to maintain or 
retain those talented people to stay in this industry… So, then that’s what I see in the Big 4 
accounting firms. So, I think the localization, it’s a trend; eventually we’ll get there, but just 
how long? But now we have the foreseeable target and so any disturbance will just jeopardize 
the progress. [11B4M p.22-5]   
 
Interviewed again in 2014, with a very senior and high-ranking colleague (also 
mainland Chinese) from outside the firm, and while recognising that MoF had helped 
smooth away many of the practical difficulties in the transition to the new SGP 
structure, and that the extra examination requirements for Hong Kong CPAs to obtain 
the CICPA qualification had been reduced, they remained concerned about the 
acceleration of the localization. 
[I]n China, the major - if you say the people are now senior or with management experience, it’s 
not really the technical things; it’s more, like, experience…So, if you bring them up to the - you 
expect those people - junior partner have an international view, it’s pretty hard - because in the 
past 20 years, we were so focused on the [technical work] - had so many IPOs - so there’s really 
just a focus on the project. 
I think in the next few years, those people will grow into the management. But still, that’s the 
problem. If you look at us before - now the senior partners are local now. And even by next 
year, I would think that senior partner is still by title only. 
(Colleague: The Chinese citizen who may have the senior partner title, but not really function 
as…The transition should be longer than that.)  [25B4M with 24IBM, p. 18] 
 
So even if the audit firm itself is ‘localized’ there may be a firm above that in the international 
structure with a board or managing committee where Chinese CPAs still do not predominate 
(Gillis 2014b). 
 
3.4 Implications of the historical development of the Chinese profession: What is a 
‘Chinese’ firm and what is a ‘foreign’ firm? 
Given the interactions between the auditing firms and the initiatives by the Chinese 
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government (primarily enacted though MoF, CICPA and CSRC) that have been traced 
in this section, a major problem in the institutional analysis is how to distinguish a 
‘Chinese’ from a ‘foreign’ firm. Moreover the ways in which the Big 4, rhetorically 
cast as ‘foreign’ firms, have recently had to accelerate the ‘localization’ of their 
firms—alongside the Chinese government’s own drive for enhancing the homegrown 
firms’ reputation as they adopt international accounting and auditing 
standards—further problematize any clear notion of what is now to be regarded as a 
‘local’ Chinese firm. The categorisation is further complicated by the growth of the 
2nd-tier international networks whose Chinese member firms are not regarded by the 
government as ‘foreign’.36  
However the embedded perceptions of which are ‘foreign’ and which are ‘local’ 
firms are still powerful in the political rhetoric as well as in the market discourses, 
both in China and internationally, and are still reflected in academic analyses such as 
those of Chan and Lau (2008), Gillis (2014a) and Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey 
(2014), while most of the academic literature also continues to dichotomise the 
worldwide profession into the Big 4 and ‘the rest’. Breaking down these stereotypes is 
consistent with Cooper et al. (1998) and Barrett et al. (2005) but to these must be 
added the focus on how this has played out specifically in China, which could be 
particularly significant given its potential worldwide impact. 
With the aim of limiting potential legal liability the websites of all categories of 
firms emphasise that their firms in individual countries are ‘independent’. But the 
extent of the actual differences in the degree of operational and management 
integration between, at one end of the spectrum, the Big 4 firms who promote their 
international brands37 and, at the other end, stand-alone firms like ShineWing (but 
which belongs to the network Praxity)38 is hard to pin down (e.g. Boussebaa & 
Morgan, 2015). 
There are differing perceptions among Chinese professionals themselves of what 
being an ‘independent’ firm means. A partner in a leading stand-alone firm 
commented:  
 
36 This latter aspect is only briefly considered in Gillis, 2014a (pp.211-3; 292; 297-8).  
37 And there are also differences between individual Big 4 firms (e.g. Stuttard, 2009). 
38 Praxity is an international alliance which primarily assists cross-referrals of work between its 
independent member firms. They keep their own names but membership is subject to Praxity’s quality 
criteria. https://www.praxity.com/about/overview/ (accessed 26.9.2019). 
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We insist upon on our own will. We do not want to join BDO and Praxity, and we are our own 
brand. We insist upon on own brand. It had to be a Chinese firm. We are dominant. If we take 
on some network or new organization, we prefer to be dominant….keep control. [22IFM, p.7] 
 
By contrast, a partner in a 2nd-tier audit network commented: 
So, the Big Four, they have a consistent system across all the world. But for BDO’s relationship 
in China with lìxìn, lìxìn is totally independent from BDO.39 [26TM, p.3] 
 
Some confusion also persists about the criteria that the Chinese government itself uses 
to differentiate ‘local’ firms from ‘foreign’ firms. Formally now the crucial test is 
whether the partners hold the CICPA’s qualification. But despite their increased 
localization since 2012 (see section 3.3 above) the perception has remained that the 
Big 4 are ‘foreign’ firms and the rhetoric about the Big 4 not being ‘local’ is hard to 
change. A senior Chinese professor commented: 
The market will do it. It will do it naturally—evolve to that situation. It is time—really a matter 
of time, right. I said if the accounting firms have high quality control, risk control all the 
management is like the international one, but they were local people, what’s the difference 
between the international firm and local firm, right, but it is strange. The Ministry of Finance 
think that Big Four—those giants—they want to dominate the Chinese market and we should 
not let them to do that. I said, if later five, ten years later—all the local [people] promoted to the 
partner level, right, it’s a local firm. But they are also following international standards. That’s 
what you want to do, actually, internationalize, right… 
The Ministry of Finance says [that the firms in the 2nd-tier networks are] a member firm…The 
Big Four’s not member firm because you dominate. See, they try to do something to restrict the 
Big Four from developing too big too fast. It’s become a policy of the Ministry of Finance…It’s 
difficult for those people—Ministry of Finance people—to change. I talked many times to them. 
That’s—you want to have Chinese accounting firms internationalized. This is the way they help 
you to go to international, right. They said, ‘No. That’s the big international firm not our firm.’ 
[16JSM p.10-11] (our emphasis added) 
 
At least as perceived through Western eyes (e.g. Stuttard, 2009)—although a lot of 
younger Chinese would not agree—wariness of and even contempt for foreign 
influences remain as a residue of the history of various humiliations China suffered 
from Western powers and Japan from the mid-19th century until the founding of the 
PRC in 1949 (e.g. Bickers, 2017). The modern need to rely on access to Western 
technology and expertise to rebuild the economy has had to overcome an inherited 
psychological resistance, but as lagging behind the West had left China having to deal 
with massive and extreme poverty, Deng Xiaoping saw the 1978 ‘reform and opening 
up’ as a clear imperative, provided this could be achieved while preserving essential 
‘Chinese characteristics’ (see Section 4.1 below). 
So in trying to define what is a ‘Chinese’ firm, ultimately one is left with simply 
problematizing the prevailing rhetorical stereotypes. One can focus on the (shifting) 
 
39 See Appendix III for BDO’s branding in China. 
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nationalities and professional qualifications of the firms' staff and executives / 
partners but perhaps even more important is their culture (discussed further in Section 
4). 
The more ‘Westernized’ Hong Kong based CPA firms are another factor in this 
equation: Chinese mainland companies listed on the main London Stock Exchange 
include for example Air China and Zhejiang Expressway Company, both audited by 
Deloitte’s Hong Kong firm; US listed companies include for example Alibaba, audited 
by PwC’s Hong Kong firm.40 
As seen from London: 
 
I think they are very different ball parks, but I do think they are a bridge. They do form the 
middle part of the bridge, particularly between China and London. Very rarely, do we go 
straight into Beijing without some discussion with the Hong Kong office. They’ve got that much 
more experience, and they are local (sic). [52TL, p.28] 
 
The practical effect of the rhetoric about ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ is that the MoF / 
CICPA’s strategy to promote the national and international status of ‘Chinese’ as 
opposed to ‘foreign’ firms is focussed on boosting the position of the 2nd-tier network 
firms and the leading standalone firms (see Appendix III). So far these have secured 
dominant roles in attracting clients in the domestic market and in domestic IPOs (see 
Tables II.1, II.3 and II.5). But the strategy is complicated by the continuing preference 
of CSRC that the Big 4 firms should audit China’s giant internationally cross-listed 
SOEs (cf. Tables II.2 and II.4). 
 
*****Insert Tables II:1-5 about here*******  
 
3.5 Summary 
Following the three stages of development and the government’s shifting and partly 
conflicting direction of it, as outlined above, the current pattern at the top of the 
Chinese profession reflects the interrelated roles of the Big 4 (recently ‘localized’), 
the 2nd-tier international networks that have embraced major domestic firms, and the 
leading stand-alone firms (see Appendix III). In this scenario the conventional 
stereotyping of ‘foreign’ vs ‘local’ firms now lacks substantive analytical content but 
instead reflects continuing political rhetoric, also reflected in conventional academic 
categorisation of firms as ‘Big4/other’. In the Chinese case one needs to look behind 
 
40 cf. http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/who-audits-alibaba.html (accessed 17.09.18).  
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the labels and see how all leading firms incorporate and meld both ‘foreign’ and ‘local’ 
characteristics in a spectrum of degrees of ‘glocalization’,41 but with differing 
political and market consequences. 
Given this section’s outline of the history (see Figure 1), the next section discusses 
certain key aspects of the background cultural and institutional context of the 
development of the profession in China and of the roles played by the international 
firms, that help to interpret both the history and the current situation (which will be 
analysed further in Section 5). 
 
4. Aspects of the cultural context of the development of China’s 
auditing profession 
 
This section highlights some key features of Chinese culture and institutional 
background that have underpinned the development of its audit firms and are also 
reflected in other major aspects of its ‘socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics’. While the concept of ‘culture’ is debated (e.g. does it refer to national 
or ethnic characteristics?—Hofstede, 2003; Baskerville, 2003; how is its history related 
to institutional history or is it a just shorthand for the effects of an array of 
distinguishing institutions?—e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; cf. Brandt et al., 2014; 
Feuchtwang and Steinmüller, 2017), the focus here is on aspects that are widely 
argued to be distinctive influences defining mainland Chinese economic, social and 
political behaviour and therefore also underlie the shaping of the Chinese auditing 
profession with consequential effects on market and regulatory interactions. 
For example, traditionally-minded Chinese auditors do not believe in ‘perfect 
systems’ and prefer to focus their work on contact with and understanding of their 
clients’ senior executives. Western-style auditing primarily relies on confirming and 
documenting how a sound institutional mechanism has been built up and on verifying 
written ‘audit trails’ (of systems, minutes, contracts, transactions etc.). In practice both 
aspects are important but one should recognise that there is a very different cultural 
emphasis behind the two basic approaches to auditing.  
A senior UK based auditor with considerable experience of working in China 
commented on some of these cultural differences in the following terms: 
 
41 Defined in 1997 by Roland Robertson as "the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both 
universalizing and particularizing tendencies." 
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… the ways they do audits are quite different from the ways we do them. And I don’t make that 
as a criticism. I think there are legitimate reasons why you would take a different approach to 
auditing in China from here. You would tend to do larger samples, more tick and bash, less 
reliance on controls, less reliance on analytics. And I think there are reasons why that’s actually 
sensible. 
 You seek different forms of evidence. Some of the hierarchies you have here about ‘written 
evidence is better than oral evidence’—I’m not sure all that’s true in China. Actually, people 
sign any old rubbish and give it to you, as confirmation. It’s not—whereas if you talk to 
somebody and get to know them, the evidence can be quite strong. 
 So, there are all sorts of differences, I think, between auditing there and auditing here. [12TL, 
pp.39ff.] 
 
So the meaning on the ground of ‘convergence with international auditing standards’ 
is problematic and depends on the cultural and social context (e.g. Mennicken, 2008; 
2010; Samsonova-Taddei, 2013). 
 
4.1 ‘Chinese characteristics’ 
China exhibits a strong form of centralized top down control of the profession, as of 
other arenas of economic and social organization, with government initiatives 
alongside market forces driving change. However, the State does not only act through 
the MoF which oversees the CICPA (e.g. Zhu & Gao, 2009) (see Appendix II). As 
noted in Section 3.4, CSRC also plays a dominant role over audit firms albeit 
pursuing a rather different agenda focussed on its regulation of the Chinese stock 
exchanges, together with a policy that those state-owned enterprises (SOE) that are 
giant financial institutions with overseas listings should continue to have Big 4 
auditors for their own international credibility.42 Both MoF and CSRC, in addition to 
CICPA, conduct inspections of audit firms. These direct government connections, 
while hard to measure, are much stronger than conveyed in Samsonova-Taddei & 
Humphrey’s (2014: 918-19; 922; 924) discussion of China in their analysis of the 
continuing power and influence of professional bodies of accountants and auditors 
vis-à-vis the firms (cf. Cooper & Robson, 2006).43  
There has recently been a restrengthening of Government emphasis on building 
 
42 Three of China’s state-owned banks, cross-listed in Hong Kong and including US investment banks 
as shareholders, are the top three in the latest Forbes list of the top-ten largest companies in the world. 
They have been audited by the Hong Kong offices of Big 4 firms. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2016/05/25/the-worlds-largest-companies-2016/#6bdb5caf
45a6 (accessed 30 August 2017). 
43 The portrayals in Aiken et al. (1997); Hao (1999); Ezzamel et al. (2007); Wang (2010); Yee (2012) 
[dealing with changes in 1995]; and Ezzamel & Xiao (2015) [dealing with changes between 1985-2000] 
also highlight the role of the State in Chinese accounting and audit regulation at those stages. More 




‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’,44 by combining ‘market 
autonomy and technoscientific administrative regulation’ under the continuing 
direction of the CPC’s political ideology (Sigley, 2006: 495), and on opposition to 
certain ‘Western values’.45  
With respect to accounting reforms, while Ezzamel & Xiao (2015) argue that by 
2000 the term ‘Chinese characteristics’ had weakened to just referring to Chinese 
‘national circumstances’ (guóqíng [国情]), the example of the change that China 
achieved in influencing one of its key international arenas through the November 
2009 revision of IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures to partially exempt its SOEs 
(Ramanna, 2013) illustrates how the terms still overlap. At one level the revision was 
simply a pragmatic recognition of the impracticality of attempting to document and 
publicly disclose all transactions between SOEs in China’s unique ‘national 
circumstances’ and was necessary if China was to be able to converge with IFRS. But 
those ‘circumstances’ are not exogenous: the continuance of the economic 
significance of the SOEs endogenously reflects the deeper ‘Chinese characteristics’ of 
its unique ‘socialist market economy’. 
One must see China’s claimed convergence with international accounting and 
auditing standards—driven by MoF and CICPA—as more than just a technical choice 
for reform and improvement consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of the ‘laws of 
economics’ (Gewirtz, 2017). It is equally a political statement in relation to the 
leading international status China perceives for itself (Reich & Lebow, 2014; Hughes, 
2016)—a perception embedded in its history and culture (e.g. Bickers, 2017) and 
expressed in its name zhōngguó [中国]: literally ‘the central country’. 
In a comparable manner to glocalization elsewhere, the rhetorical role of ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ may now be seen as continuing to mark an ever shifting boundary 
between what is perceived in China as ‘Western’ as distinct from what must be 
 
44 The title of President Xi Jinping’s ‘Thought’ (新时代中国特色社会主义思想 [xīn shídài zhòngguó 
tèsè shèhuìzhŭyì]) that is now part of the CPC constitution. 
45 Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi Jinping (known to his people as ‘Xí Dàdà’ [习大大] 
(‘Uncle Xi’)), has been encouraging a refocus on Confucian values to underpin China’s economic 
development path and mitigate some of its adverse consequences (e.g. China Daily, 18 April 2015, p4) 
alongside a renewed emphasis on the country’s and the CPC’s founding Marxism-Leninism and Mao 




ote-western-values (both accessed 19 June 2019)).  
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maintained as distinctively ‘Chinese’.46 
 
4.2 guānxì  
There is an emerging literature attempting to explain the significance of guānxì [关系] 
in China, which is hard to translate but refers to the social nexus of personal and 
business relationships that usually result in building up mutual reciprocal obligations 
(e.g. Wong, 2014). Building such social capital with business and government 
contacts is seen as a vital precondition to building reputational (‘symbolic’) and 
economic capital (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and has been captured in the 
label ‘relationships are the law’ (Osburg, 2013: Chapter 3). Because there may be no 
written evidence of agreements / understandings, the mutual obligations that are built 
up may not fit into Western definitions of ‘related parties’ and ‘related party 
transactions’, and because they are long-lasting but often non-specific they cannot be 
conventionally measured as accounting’s ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ (e.g. Upson, n.d.).  
A senior UK based auditor with considerable experience of working in China 
commented on some of the visible cultural differences of this Chinese characteristic in 
the following terms: 
I’m not really saying there’s anything wrong with what is going on in China, it’s just perceived 
by the West as not necessarily being how they would do it because in China, legal form means 
less than guānxì. So there’s always a misunderstanding by Western auditors whenever it’s a 
Chinese company, that there’s something dodgy going on, or there’s transaction flow with no 
evidence, or so and so has agreed with so and so to do that. It’s not every day: but you need to 
appreciate that and understand it. You need to find an alternative procedure to gain comfort. It is 
an inherent issue for Western style audits… 
 You need to really understand it, really understand what’s going on. Let me give you one 
example. What is very, very common in China is where the government will give or sell a piece 
of land to a company to attract them to go there. And then instruct builders to build the complex.  
Something that happens very often in China is for tax reasons the bills are invoiced very, very 
late. Sometimes when you do audits, you’ve got the cost of the building, where half of it’s 
accrued but it hasn’t been invoiced yet, and it’s a very common thing in China. Sometimes there 
might be a construction agreement, so you’ve got something to tick off, but otherwise, all you 
know is there’s a building there. But you haven’t got any invoices to prove it… 
 You know they’ve got to pay something, so how do you get audit comfort on the accrual? And 
it’s very, very common that you can’t see it—you can see the issue. [32TL pp25-6] 
 
So there may be further consequences for the practical substance of the convergence 
of Chinese and international accounting and auditing standards. However, the major 
analytical problem remains of identifying how far guānxì creates relationships in 
China that have a more powerful hidden influence than similar social bonds that 
 
46 They may be seen as playing the role of a ‘boundary object’ (e.g. Star, 2010; Clarke, 2010)—objects 
whose definitions change along with shifts in their linked ecologies.  
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prevail in Western societies (cf. Samsonova-Taddei, 2013).47 Moreover, as markets 
extend wider and wider, with relationships based less and less on personal 
acquaintance, the need for more formal and specific contractual agreements is 





47 Du et al. (2015) explore in a laboratory experiment how guānxì might influence a Chinese auditor’s 
reaction to earnings management where the stock-exchange rule that ‘3 years’ losses’ leads to 
automatic delisting would bite. However, they do not control for how far comparable connections 




The traditional structure of Chinese businesses, including Chinese auditing firms, also 
reflects the control characteristics of Chinese society, which remain as a legacy from 
the Mao era that goes back to the Emperors (Brandt et al., 2014).48 A senior Western 
interviewee with substantial experience of working there as managing partner of a Big 
4 firm commented on the fundamental importance of understanding this aspect of 
China:  
And this goes back to something right at the heart of Chinese society. They wanted to control 
the control function. Now auditing is a sort of part of the control function…It’s another control 
mechanism of business and of financial reporting. Now if you add onto that the extra dimension 
of China being a control society, where control is like a sixth sense...somebody has to control it. 
And you should think of Chinese society in that light…because auditing is part—was an integral 
part of the Chinese economy, which the Chinese government would not permit to be handled by 
a foreigner...I think it’s important to make this control point because it influences the way that 
all Chinese governments think, and it is something very historical that they’re reluctant to 
delegate authority to a subsidiary body, and then leave that subsidiary body completely free to 
do what it wants to do because they…have this in-built sense that we must control our destiny. 
And this comes out of Chinese history…But long Chinese history: if you lose control, then 
you’re finished…You have to, I think, always bear this concept in mind. [20B4L pp.11-12]49 
 
Correspondingly the nature of Chinese audit regulation is primarily the ‘command 
and control’ type of government regulation and it is not yet clear whether China will 
want or be able to move towards the ‘enforced self-regulation’ model that has become 
increasingly common in the West, based on the internalization by the regulated of the 
spirit and objective of the rules more than on compliance with their formal 
requirements (e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), to allow more flexible responses 
aligned to market and other pressures ‘on the ground’. Interviewees commented on 
the current burden on audit firms of being subject to overlapping inspections by 
CICPA, MoF and CSRC, albeit with some perception that the last is more effectively 
focussed on outcomes while the others are more focussed on procedural compliance 
(which may reflect the legacy of their inheritance from government auditing, e.g. 
 
48 MoF warnings about potential government influence over auditors were set out in Document 56 (see 
Section 4.2.2). Government control still extends not just over the press and media but, inter alia, into 
family life (e.g. the ‘one-child policy’—now ‘two-child policy’), religious practice, allocation of 
university places, political education, residence status and related social and welfare benefits (the 
hùkǒu [户口] system), and the developing ‘social credit’ system for scoring all individuals 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained [accessed 4.6.19]. See e.g 
Feuchtwang & Steinmüller (2017). 
49 An anonymous referee has helpfully pointed out that the government’s instinctive emphasis on 
maintaining control can help explain why, despite localization, the Big 4 are still regarded as subject to 
‘foreign’ control whereas the firms in the 2nd-tier networks and the stand-alone firms are seen as more 




Aiken et al., 1997).50 A senior Chinese Big 4 partner commented:  
How many regulations is sufficient? How many regulations is efficient? That’s the government’s 
job to judge what’s the degree, but for the regulators to our business---if we [self]regulate---I 
would rather they regulate the environment, not regulated our regulations. [11B4M, pp.39-42] 
 
This ‘top-down’ control mentality is reflected at the audit firm level. While there are 
tensions in all ‘global’ IPSFs between federal ‘integration’ and ‘independence’ 
(Boussebaa & Morgan, 2015), and understanding of how ‘leadership’ operates in 
professional service firms is still relatively undeveloped in the literature (e.g. Empson 
& Langley, 2015), our interviewees commented that Chinese firms have traditionally 
had a ‘big boss’, who culturally inherits the role of a Confucian father figure (e.g. 
Feuchtwang and Steinmüller, 2017), so that adapting to a leadership model where the 
managing partner traditionally has a more collegial role (despite IPSFs adopting 
increasingly corporate structures—Suddaby & Muzio, 2015) may, at the least, take 
time (e.g. Gillis, 2014b, p.69; cf. Cheng et al., 2004). This has been a constraint on 
effective mergers of firms and a Chinese senior partner commented that in his view 
one of the greatest risks for the future ‘is whether the Chinese firms can finally find 
the core concept of the partnership model’ [262TM]—i.e. he feared they would not.  
Such differences imply that the simplified categories normally used to describe the 
auditing field (big versus small firms, international versus local) are flawed. There is a 
need for new categories and to draw attention to more different aspects than just size, 
including management and regulatory styles (see also Samsonova-Taddei, 2013). As 
Chinese firms continue to outgrow the Western firms in their linked international 
networks there will be a need to research how this far this has consequences for those 
networks’ organizational structures. 
 
4.4 Summary 
The enduring ‘Chinese characteristics’ of the ‘socialist market economy’ include not 
only continuing government control of its SOEs (even where listed), but a pervasive 
control mentality that shapes the nature of regulation (in which the judicial structure 
plays only a subsidiary role) as well as the management style of both companies and 
audit firms. While there is an obsession with gaining professional reputation through 
 
50 For example all audit adjustments to the accounts as well as items left unadjusted have to be 
reported to CICPA [9PBM p.22], a practice which this interviewee regarded as a pointless attempt at 
micro-control. This would merit further research. 
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highly visible exam qualifications,51 there is an underlying culture of business 
relationships, under the umbrella label of guānxì, that remains in many respects 
mysterious to Western eyes.  
Suddaby et al. (2007) have seen recent decades of changes in professional services 
firms—and in particular accounting firms—and their regulation as characterised by 
‘shifting governance: from local monopoly to global cartel’( p. 337). But while this 
pattern identifies major changes that have emerged from the West52 it is necessary to 
explore how closely this pattern fits a China whose ‘socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics’ remains outside the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ 
version of capitalism. Its biggest companies and financial institutions, although partly 
listed domestically and overseas, are still state controlled; and bank finance (in turn 
primarily supplied by the giant state controlled banks) has been more important than 
stockmarket finance (Allen et al. 2008)—with private finance by entrepreneurs and 
from their families and contacts having been even more significant.  
Against this background to an understanding of Chinese institutions, and how their 
characteristics and linkages have been interactively changing both nationally and 
internationally (e.g. Lounsbury, 2008), one can ask how ‘existing work on the 
transnational regulation of accounting [may be combined] with a contemporaneous 
understanding of the forces for regulatory and professional change, and insight into 
the roles that various actors have assumed historically and will likely play going 
forward…[given their multiple] agendas and strategies of influence’ (Gillis et al. 2014: 
894). It remains to be seen what the global outcome will be as the two economic and 
social ‘tectonic plates’ of China and the West increasingly collide and whether they 
will follow a path of productive collaboration or destructive competition (e.g. 
Suddaby and Muzio, 2015).  
This section has highlighted how understanding important aspects of the cultural 
context in China further emphasises the need not to categorize its auditing firms as 
 
51 ‘[The CICPA exam] has always been very tough a qualification to obtain. You nearly need to die to 
get it…It has become more robust over the years, and however tough the exam is, it doesn't bother the 
Chinese because they’re used to it. And however many qualifications there are, the Chinese will pursue 
them, so you see a lot of Chinese accountants, having not only CPA, but also ACA, also ACCA, also 
Australian CPA—whichever country is clever enough to promote their qualification or program, the 
Chinese will pursue them.’ [22TL, p.21] 
52 However Quack & Schüßler (2015) contest the universality of this analysis; and Samsonova-Taddei 
& Humphrey (2015) comment on how the firms failed to secure an EU-wide resolution on the issue of 
auditor liability and ‘the residing significance of the authority of the nation state in the European audit 
policy context’.  
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simply ‘the foreign Big 4 and the domestic rest’ but to understand the spectrum of 
types of firms and in particular the strategic role of the homegrown firms in the 
2nd-tier international networks, together with some large stand-alone mainland firms, 
in the government’s plans, now that they have shifted from building a ‘Big One’ to the 
multi-layered strategy of Document 56. In building up the Chinese profession’s 
reputation domestically and internationally, and given the government’s rhetoric about 
what firms are still regarded as ‘foreign’, the Hong Kong based firms are another 
element in this complex mix. All of them to a greater or lesser extent reflect ‘Chinese 
characteristics’, including the influence of guānxì and the ‘control’ mentality of 
organization, but also reflect the trends to glocalization, where they, alongside the 
government, can increasingly be seen to be both influenced by and influencing the 
international strategies of audit firms as IPSFs, together with the international 
standard setting and regulatory bodies such as IASB and PCAOB. 
Given this background to the pattern of recent developments, the next section 
attempts to draw out interviewees’ varied perceptions of the current position of 
China’s auditing profession domestically and internationally and of its potential for 
the future.  
This opens up a number of potential research avenues, as will be suggested in 
Section 6.1. 
 
5. Challenges and opportunities facing audit firms in China 
 
This section aims to bring out how the key recent changes within the rapidly recreated 
Chinese profession and related institutions are seen, by our interviewees and others, to 
have established the present patterns of firms’ relative market strength—illustrated in 
Tables II:1-5—with potential consequences for the wider and ongoing changes in the 
global profession (e.g. Zeff, 2003; Empson et al., 2015). 
 
5.1 Enhancement of the professional reputation of the non-Big 4 firms 
China joined the WTO in 2001 and accession increased ‘Westernizing’ pressures 
(Arnold, 2005) and opened the door to greatly increased FDI53 and to the rapid 
growth of China’s own capital markets. On the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
 
53 FDI was originally into China but has increasingly been offset by outward flows as China expands 
investments overseas (Reich & Lebow, 2014, Chapter 4) see e.g. 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_fdistat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_CHN.pdf (accessed 12.11.14). 
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exchanges domestic IPOs of SOEs and private companies have increasingly been 
handled by non-Big 4 firms (Al-Natour et al., 2017)—see Table II: 4-5.54 Other 
Chinese companies, particularly giant SOEs, were obtaining listings, not only in Hong 
Kong (Hung et al., 2012), but more significantly abroad. In particular US listings 
(requiring expertise inter alia in US GAAP and SEC regulations) have constituted 
‘the most significant factor in the growth of the [Big 4] firms in China and an 
important factor that led to their domination (sic) of the accounting profession’ (Gillis, 
2014a: 115).  
I mean…the shareholding is more than just a case of raising capital. The listed State Owned 
Enterprises don’t need the money, it’s listing status. It’s a badge: I’m listed in the US; I’m listed 
in London. [32TL p.28] 
 
As emphasis has now swung more to facilitating Hong Kong and domestic listings, 
and given tensions between China and the PCAOB over audit inspections,55 so the 
opportunities for non-Big 4 firms have increased.  
The SSE and Hong Kong exchanges are also increasing their international presence. 
The flotation of high-technology companies, such as Alibaba’s massive flotation in the 
US in 2014, brought out several difficulties with the required procedures for gaining 
listing in Shanghai or Hong Kong, and for attracting overseas finance.56 The Hong 
Kong Exchange has been consulting on proposals to attract companies from such new 
economy sectors.57 With the advent of the ‘H-share’ licenses in 2011 (see Appendix III) 
and potential greater internationalization of SSE, this in turn could also open up new 
incentives for China’s non-Big 4 audit firms, that have so far been restricted to the 
much smaller domestic IPOs, to compete to acquire extremely large domestic clients 
that are currently listing overseas and thereby build a reputation that could lead to 
acting additionally for foreign listed companies too.58 
 
54 A preference confirmed in conversation with a representative of the investment banking arm of a 
securities firm specialising in domestic IPOs.  
55 There have been stand-offs between the US PCAOB and the international firms over demands for 
inspection of audit working papers relating to US listed companies which it has been argued would 
breach China’s ‘state secrets’ laws: 
https://pcaobus.org/International/Inspections/pages/issuerclientswithoutaccess.aspx (accessed 
16.9.2018). The Hong Kong FRC is in continuing negotiation with MoF over access to audit working 
papers in the mainland (Annual Report 2017, pp. 11, 57) 
56 Apparently Hong Kong’s rules on ownership structure had prevented Alibaba’s listing there: 
http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1341457/jack-ma-hints-continued-interest-hong-kon
g-listing-alibaba (accessed 31.5.2015) but it has now made a secondary IPO there: 
https://fortune.com/2019/11/26/markets-alibaba-ipo-hong-kong/ (accessed 21.1.20). 
57 http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2017/170616news.htm (accessed 1.10.2017). 
58 Opportunities for investors in mainland China and in Hong Kong to invest in each others’ stocks 
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The government had not only been strongly encouraging mergers of audit firms 
since 2000 to enhance their professional strength and market position (see section 
4.2.1 above; cf. DeFond et al., 2000) but in December 2007 nine ministries and other 
top-level agencies of the State Council together announced several ‘opinions’ on 
support for audit firms’ international expansion, encouraging them to go abroad, to set 
up international networks, and to establish their own international brands.59  
It seems too early to say how the enforced localization of the Big 4 will affect 
perceptions of their strength relative to that of the other firms now that they are all 
formally ‘Chinese’. On the one hand, even if the Big 4 retain the advantage of their 
brand they still do not match the government’s own vision to see a recognizably 
‘Chinese’ firm among the world leaders. On the other, if the localization has been too 
rapid, their reputation for quality may be tarnished. Either way this suggests that the 
government strategy will remain focussed on positioning the firms in the 2nd-tier 
networks and leading stand-alone firms to become not just domestically but also 
‘internationally’ recognised. 
The government has also been encouraging the large SOEs that it administers 
through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (SASAC) to favour domestic firms (including those in the 2nd-tier 
international networks) for appointment as auditors since mandatory periodic 
re-tendering was introduced, allegedly to reduce the risk of state secrets leaking 
abroad through ‘foreign firms’ (as the Big 4 are still perceived to be).60 So far this 
initiative has had limited success partly due to CSRC still prioritizing its different 
agenda for the giant financial institutions (that are SOEs with foreign listings), 
wanting the Big 4 to remain as their auditors to underpin overseas confidence (Gillis, 
2014a: 290; 296-7 [confirmed by our interviewees]). 
While some of the firms that have joined the 2nd-tier international networks have 
 
through the ‘Stock Connect’ initiative were jointly announced on April 10 2014, to begin on 17 
November 2014 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-11/10/content_18891935.htm [accessed 
10.11.14]). The first Stock Connect link between SSE and the London Stock Exchange was announced 
on 14 June 2019 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201906/t20190617_357422.html [accessed 
22.06.19).  
If the legislation recently proposed by Senator Rubio is passed many Chinese companies may transfer 
from US listing to Hong Kong (or Shanghai) listing: 
https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/rubio-proposes-to-delist.html (accessed 17.6.19) 
59 Document 507 http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=247317 (in Chinese: accessed 
9.6.2015). 
60 Big 4 representatives absolutely deny that any such breach of client confidentiality (and of Chinese 
law) could occur (e.g. 25B4M, p. 35). 
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recently overtaken some of the Big 4 in terms of total revenue for the first time, and 
the two largest stand-alone firms are not far behind (see Appendix III) it seems 
unlikely that they have been as successful in gaining revenue from non-audit work or 
from ‘international’ work (i.e. from companies listed outside China); or even from 
‘multinational’ work as their clients expand overseas (since it seems more likely that 
the work would be referred to the relevant countries’ firms in each network). Given 
the size of China’s population (about 18% of the world total compared to the US at 
about 4%)61 it need be no surprise that domestic work alone can increasingly provide 
the largest source of revenue (as illustrated in Tables II: 1 and 3.)62 
But revenue growth within China is not sufficient to create a reputation that matches 
the current Big 4. As seen from London: 
It will take a long process. You are not going to be able to become credible leading firms only 
because your revenue gets there. It takes a whole host of criteria – it takes a whole host of things 
for a firm to be a credible leading firm. Having said that, China is probably the only economy in 
the world where this is possible. [22TL p.4] (our emphasis added) 
 
From our interviews six of the major factors in the present situation that are seen as 
likely to influence the outcome have emerged:  
(1) firm strength—the non-Big 4 firms do not yet have sufficient capability to audit the 
giant SOEs, especially those that have overseas listings. So far it is mainly consulting 
and tax services that some of them can also manage to provide to big SOEs (in line with 
one strand of the MoF’s 2009 ‘Document 56’ strategy).  
One of the things that Wang Jun63 mentioned is that we need the confidence of the other 
alliances, networks, to show us that you can resource, that you have the skills, that you have the 
quality, that you have the people to actually undertake this audit work outside of China. We’re 
confident in China. ShineWing has 2800 people in China, but outside of China, can you really 
handle auditing Sinopec or whatever it is, and that is now up to all of us [in the 2nd-tier 
networks]…to actually show the Chinese government that outside of China, we all have the 
capability to take on the Big Four. [52TL p.4 (interviewed in 2011)] 
 
 
A London Big 4 view was:  
I don’t think it’s realistic today to expect those Chinese firms to serve clients and provide 
quality service to clients, where those clients are beyond the scope and capability of those firms. 
It doesn't matter what the Chinese government’s saying. [6B4L p.3 (interviewed in 2011)] 
 
(2) reputational legacy and perceived independence. Having started from scratch with 
only about 40 years of development of the modern CPA industry since the ‘opening and 
 
61 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population (accessed 19.6.2019) 
62 For the latest CICPA ranking see 
https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/the-big-four-are-back-in.html (accessed 24.6.2019). 
63 When Vice-Minister of Finance.  
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reform’ started, only about 25 years since CICPA itself was finally established in 1995, 
and only about 20 years since audit firms were fully disaffiliated from their sponsoring 
government units (see Figure 1), the other firms cannot yet compete with the 
long-established reputations of the Big 4. In a still-emerging economy like China, the 
fact of being a client of a credible audit firm is much more important than the actual 
assurance effectiveness that the auditing service could provide, especially as there are 
few if any reliable measures of differences in assurance effectiveness between the Big 4 
and other audit firms (e.g. Faulconbridge, 2015: 446). And in the case of overseas 
listings the Big 4 are part of the ‘international brands’ circle of the ‘top grade’ 
investment banks, lawyers and other advisers to whom companies around the world 
turn. 
You know, the Chinese love brands, but the Big Four are…really, the brands. Quite often, the 
only reason why indigenous firms do well is when the government gives them work. [32TL p.9] 
 
Reminiscent perhaps of the handicap of the original government-affiliated 
background of Chinese indigenous audit firms (and consistent with the pattern of 
auditor choice found by Wang et al., 2008), MoF announced in 2009 (within 
‘Document 56’) that no government department could limit the practices of audit 
firms or influence their audit opinions. Nothing can be totally transparent with respect 
to government influences in China but the announcement of this policy in itself 
suggests that there were still instances of interference from government organs 
occurring which might result in significant differences both between other countries 
and China and between some SOEs and non-SOEs in respect of corporate governance 
and business culture. As seen from London:  
I think the challenge of practicing in China, whether you’re lawyers or accountants, is that 
where the public listed company ends and the state begins, is an incredibly difficult position to 
establish. And when push comes to shove, and the chips are on the table, it’s pretty clear that it 
doesn’t matter which set of CEOs or CFOs you’re talking to, they’re not completely clear that 
they’re on their own, and that’s a very difficult challenge. And it’s a difficult challenge for the 
firms in conducting audit work, for example. [4RGL p.10-14] 
 
Correspondingly audit judgements about ‘going concern’ status are rendered more 
complex. Again: 
 
I’m not sure in terms of government influence on audit firms. I think government influence on 
the SOEs – I mean, it’s going to stay there for a long time. How does that then spill into audit – 
I’m not sure. [7B4L p.16] 
 
However, some interviewees suggested that, while central government SOEs and 
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those in the major cities are increasingly concerned to be transparent, the main 
problems may lie with provincial governments’ incentives to promote the success of 
the SOEs they sponsor in their own region, leading some to apply pressure to show 
highly successful results (consistent with Chan et al., 2012).  
A senior former regulator remained concerned: 
But local government, in many cases it is in this level…Especially the performance assessment 
for the local government—one thing is how many listed companies you’ve got….So, that’s why 
they have an incentive...To a certain extent this announcement is quite good just because they 
want to stop all these wrong ways. But, still, it depends on how to practice…How to undertake 
these rules seriously in their jurisdictions. If local governments didn’t mind64 the 
announcement—they didn’t get serious on these announcement—they still do their 
ways…There is a bright future, but there’s still a long way you have to go. [14RGM p.33-36] 
 
Nevertheless, the foundation of legally independent status of firms since disaffiliation 
in 1999, together with MoF’s 2009 declaration, has paved the way for strengthening 
their independence in fact as well as in appearance, and for enhancing their 
reputations.  
(3) audit liability. Barret et al. (2005) highlight potential litigation risk (alongside 
increasing commercialization) as a key ‘globalizing’ driver in constructing the nature 
of ‘local’ audit work. In the Chinese situation, domestic legal risks have till now been 
generally ignored (although potential regulatory penalties can be very serious).  
 
The thing we worry more about is regulation, than about lawsuit. It’s quite different from the 
UK, or USA. [22IFM, p.26]65 
 
There have also been procedural restrictions on the ability to sue: 
One regulation of the CSRC is very interesting: that if you want to sue the accounting firms 
[there is] only two years period window…..if you want to sue the accounting firms there is a 
preliminary procedure before the lawsuit…you have to [make a statement of claim] to the 
CSRC first. If you fail…you cannot sue. [16JSM, pp.43-46] 
 
So seeking greater international exposure will bring the risk of facing much larger 
liability claims from international investors.66 
 
 
64 ‘didn’t mind’ = ‘paid no attention to’ 
65 CSRC in 2017 twice temporarily banned two 2nd-tier network firms—Ruihua and lìxìn—and also 
imposed a massive fine on ShineWing 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4132674-shinewing-faces-huge-fine; cf. 
https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/the-big-four-are-back-in.html (both accessed 
17.6.2019). 
66 Chinese firms do now have to carry insurance: ‘We now have the liability insurance as well and the 
price is usually one per cent of our operating revenue.’ [262TM, p.24]. Caution in entering into the 
Hong Kong audit market (cf. Appendix III) may reflect the much higher litigation risk in its well 
established international stock market. 
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(4) interaction with development of clients’ corporate governance. China’s listed 
companies (with the support of CSRC) have increasingly adopted forms of corporate 
governance that are recognised elsewhere, e.g. a two-tier board structure, 
non-executive directors (NEDs) and audit committees (Jun Lin et al., 2008; Yong 
Kang et al., 2008; Cho & Rui, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Zhang, 2016). Together with 
audit they form the control environment of mutually reinforcing ‘gatekeepers’ that 
help strengthen investor confidence (Sunder, 1996; Coffee, 2006) and they thereby 
enhance the power of the audit itself. But for entrepreneurs who have built up a 
business by themselves or with the aid of their family, having independent directors 
etc. is difficult and takes time to adapt to, while SOEs still have elements of 
government control. 
I think they’re catching up, following almost a similar model as what we do in the West, and 
you will see quite a lot of the particularly publicly listed businesses, or the very large SOEs 
being a more stringent kind of governance structure. They will have an audit committee—well, 
arguably, their audit committee will be quite different to a Western audit committee. Their audit 
committee will have nominated government officials, who sit on it. [22TL p17ff]67 
 
A former Chief Accountant of the CSRC commented to us on the need for NEDs to 
challenge management effectively and how CSRC, with input from the Big 4, are 
organizing training programmes for them. As audit committees must include some 
accounting expertise it is common—given the high esteem in which Chinese 
professors are held—to appoint an accounting professor as chairman. While this may 
help ensure independence he also had doubts about how effective they can be if the 
rest of the committee is not strong, given their limited experience of actual accounting 
and business practice.68  
Again a professor commented: 
In the early years you said professors—famous professors serve on the board—gradually change 
—now the internal—the audit committees mainly by three kinds of people; one is the 
accounting professionals—senior accounting professionals or with the accounting experience. 
One is more experienced—the industry experience mainly by…now gradually change…Now 
we have less and less academics serve on the board. [16JSM p.33-34] 
 
On the other hand the professors who have this role that we have interviewed clearly 
take very seriously their responsibilities as audit committee chairmen and their roles 
 
67 Interviewed in 2011. Since October 2013 only those retired officials (who include senior university 
professors) who meet strictly limited criteria are still allowed to sit on audit committees: 
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=-mGfPzRRl8eCKp0oXsW4nZnmiZQrt1hcwQxIQYJ93iidMk_bbrzTQ
zgLAfQ-JYfYPzkK61M8Rho73IqDl4oG3K [in Chinese] (accessed 3.1.2015) (confirmed in July 2014 
by 24IBM, p.51). 
68 [14RGM p.28-32]. See also Jun Lin et al. (2008) for the situation a decade ago. 
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in the choice of auditors and in negotiating realistic audit fees—an audit committee 
chairman commented that fees can be problematic as perception of audit as a valuable 
service rather than just a regulatory imposition is still far from universal.  
 
An independent director has little influence in the decision of the remuneration plans of 
managers. But, they have significant influence on other aspects, such as internal control, 
information disclosure, transactions between related parties…In these aspects they have a very 
useful position to play. [13JSM p.13] 
 
They are also aware that the financial press is increasingly vigilant. Two comments 
from those who preferred to remain completely anonymous were: 
I mean, transparency for listed company I think is no problem. Is similar to the western 
world…this is one of the famous Chinese financial newspapers, the ‘21st Century Business 
[Herald]’ [rustling of newspaper]…One of the papers published here, it all indicates they are 
doing a fairly good job in monitoring the behaviour of Chinese companies…The newspaper – 
like this—is always…bad news for this company. Not the good news...Like your FT. (in 2011)69 
 
And social media are also helping to raise awareness: 
 
Because of the Internet…and Chinese Twitter plays a great job in media. The government may 
want to influence media but they can’t because of that and recently, information has become 
more public, more fair. Maybe the company should care [about] the media.  
 
However, it is common to hold multiple NED appointments which may raise concerns 
over how much attention can be paid to each one and to getting behind the 
information provided by the executives.70 
It should also be remembered that while corporate governance may as yet be 
regarded as ‘good’ in only a proportion of Chinese listed companies it may also be 
argued to be still patchy in much of the EU. A Big 4 view from London was: 
I would say, where does it differ from the UK? It’s an emerging economy. All of this is very 
new, so inevitably, I would say corporate governance, quality of audit committees, effectiveness 
of oversight and so on, is just less mature in China than it is in the UK. I think it’s very mature 
in the UK. I think it’s probably the best in the world, in my unobjective, but reasonably 
experienced opinion. So, it’s not a surprise that I would have that view…I could compare it with 
some mature economies in continental Europe, where perhaps all the building blocks are in 
place, but the reality of the effectiveness of corporate governance is actually not all that 
great...And I think in China…there’s been rapid progress, I would say, along that way. [6B4L 
p.5] 
 
(5) adoption of IFRS / ISAs. China’s homegrown audit firms remain in a somewhat 
paradoxical situation. Even though formal adoption of international standards allows 
 
69 However it was reported in September 2014 that the paper was being investigated for alleged 
corruption in taking bribes to ‘doctor’ its reporting on companies. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/25/us-china-corruption-media-idUSKCN0HK17O20140925 
(accessed 7.12.2012). The relevant individuals were suspended and the paper is still published. 
70 Apparently the CSRC currently allows a maximum of five concurrent appointments [24IBFM, p.51]. 
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them all to claim they are now operating to the same standards as the Big 4 and 
2nd-tier international networks, there is still a steep learning curve in matching the 
technical familiarity their international competitors have through long experience, and 
in catching up with their actual practices. Not all listed companies and their auditors 
can be expected to fully understand and consistently implement them since they are 
not a set of standards that has grown from within China’s specific economic 
environment and culture (cf. Xiao and Hu, 2017). As our top-level interviewee at 
CICPA observed, having noted that in the US, EU etc. those countries had had input 
to the development of standards that would better fit their situation:  
But for China, we just adopt, we just introduced the whole set of standards to China. Just tell the 
people just ‘from Heaven’: please follow this. [You are u]sing lesser standards, now follow this. 
So, might be, how difficult—for China accountants to do that job…The thing is to teach, to train, 
to explain, to guide. Simply imagine… [9PBM p.18] 
 
Clearly there are here similarly open questions relating not only to the literal 
translation of ISAs and IAS/IFRS (cf. Kettunen, 2017) into Chinese, where an 
English-speaking partner in a leading stand-alone firm commented: 
We have a Chinese version…Usually, we learn it in Chinese, not in English. There is no way 
for—even for us, we learn it in Chinese. Because although there is convergence between IFRS 
and Chinese…we learn, we use, we communicate in Chinese. [22IFM, p.28] 
 
but also to translation into the Chinese business culture (where for example 
undocumented relationships—guānxì—remain important (see Section 4.2)). There are 
also wider performative translation issues, such as those that Mennicken (2008; 2010), 
Samsonova (2009) and Samsonova-Taddei (2013) have explored in the case of Russia, 
which problematize the very notion of converged ‘international auditing standards’. 
More fundamental may be the consequences of a different cultural background and in 
particular a different approach to education and to the role of regulatory rules. As a 
leading UK regulator commented: 
So [at school] you don’t learn [science] by experimentation, by error, and so forth. Now, why do 
I raise that? I raise that because the natural characteristic, natural cultural approach is to read the 
standards, apply the standards and move on again. So professional judgment, in the way that we 
understand it and expect it, and, bear in mind, the way we draft standards, in the expectation that 
professional judgment will be applied, means that there is a practical performance issue there, 
which as a regulator, I sit there and say, “I wonder where that’s going to take us.” [4RGL, p.16] 
 
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties of unravelling precisely what convergence with 
international standards means, the very fact that China’s businesses and their audit 
firms are now officially working to international standards means that (as in Russia: 
Mennicken, 2008: 394), the homegrown Chinese audit firms can now claim to 
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understand and be working to the same standards as the Big 4 and the international 
network firms, which removes a major barrier to their ability to compete on reputation 
for technical expertise. 
(6) development of non-audit services (NAS). One pillar of the 2009 ‘Document 56’ 
strategy was extending the service range of China’s CPA firms beyond audit. 
Internationally the leading firms have become ‘IPSFs’ offering a range of consultancy 
services to clients (Zeff, 2003; Suddaby et al., 2007; Empson et al., 2015) which in 
turn has raised concern about threats to their independence as auditors (e.g. Gwilliam 
et al., 2014). Expansion of the scope of non-audit services (NAS) to a 50:50 split 
between audit and NAS fees income is a MoF / CICPA target.71 CICPA’s perception 
appears to be that firms must claim the full range of skills of the international 
‘knowledge experts’ (e.g. Covaleski et al., 2003; Barrett & Hinings, 2015) if they are 
to be seen as serious competitors to the Big 4 firms and the 2nd-tier international 
networks. However a professor who acts as a NED and Audit Committee chair for 
several listed companies commented in a conversation in July 2014 that the audit / 
NAS split is currently about 50/50 for the Big 4 but still 60-70 / 40-30 for other firms, 
and they are building up their services largely by recruiting talent from the Big 4 
firms [28JSM]. A leading stand-alone firm’s partner commented: 
 
We have a consulting service. We have a tax service. But maybe 90 percent or 80 percent is 
audit…. [CICPA] encourage the consulting business. They want to see more part of the 
consulting portion of the business. It’s very difficult for Chinese firm to expand non-auditing 
services. It’s very difficult. The clients just don’t want to pay a lot of money. [22IFM, p.14]72 
 
Our senior CICPA interviewee pointed out [9PBM] that, despite CICPA’s awareness 
of the debates in the US, Europe and elsewhere over potential conflicts of interest 
from NAS, at least at this stage of development it is the expansion of CPAs’ 
consultancy capabilities that is seen as the priority. And a professor experienced in 
regulation commented 
 
And the Ministry of Finance is actually encouraging—they have encouraged it—those local 
firms to do the consulting even though the international firms they cannot do some of the 
consulting services because of independence issues, but in China people say, no, just do 
it—encourage that kind of accounting firm. But it will take time…[it’s still ] small scale and low 
level of service…Yes, they call—I saw this—they call it the multiple line of 
 
71 See ‘The Dragon and the Kangaroo’ in Charter magazine, May 2011, based on an interview with Dr. 
Chen Yugui, Deputy President and Secretary-General of CICPA. 
72 CICPA has recently begun to publish the breakdown: 
https://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/the-big-four-are-back-in.html (accessed 24.6.2019) 
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service—something like that, that you promote this and currently the independence issue is not 
an issue at the time, but gradually if they develop they will find that probably have to pay 
attention to the independence. [16JSM p.26-28] 
 
And of course it remains the view of the Western firms (as expressed to us by the 
Global Chairman of one of the Big 4)73 that NAS are crucial for developing essential 
expert support skills for effective auditors and for their training (as well as for 
attracting the best talent into the profession). 
 
5.2 Hurdles facing non-Big 4 firms 
The factors identified in section 5.1 above reflect the interlinked developments 
through which the reputation and market strength of the second-tier and leading 
stand-alone firms are being strengthened in the Chinese context. However significant 
hurdles remain to equalising their competitive strength with the current Big 4 firms. 
 
5.2.1 Unintended consequences of accelerated localization of the Big 4? 
Many of the interviewees overall thought that the simplest way in which MoF’s target 
of a ‘Chinese superleague’ could be realised most quickly would be through accepting 
that the accelerated localization of the Big 4 has transformed them into genuinely 
‘Chinese’ firms, complementing the bringing of homegrown firms into the 
international 2nd-tier networks.  
The award of H-share licences (see Appendix III) to firms beyond the Big 4 is a 
first step towards those other Chinese firms becoming ‘international’ firms in the 
sense of auditing companies listed on international exchanges. But, paradoxically, 
despite concerns about the speed of change, localization may actually further 
strengthen the position of the Big 4 as the leading international Chinese firms. Their 
dominant partners will then be fluent in both Mandarin and in English, as well as 
having significant international experience. As a London Big 4 partner put it: 
This is where, at the end of the day, you have to have PRC partners. You have to have PRC 
partners who speak English, so that you have to have PRC partners who have done their 
international roles, and their English language at university, and have done their accounting, and 
speak Mandarin…And so they can operate in two languages. They can understand both cultures, 
both the domestic culture and the international culture. And you’ve got really only a few 
foreigners can achieve that, just a few. We have a few in our offices in China who would operate 
at that level, and very many PRC Nationals who operate at that level. [20B4L, p.29] 
 
So will the government accept that the localized Big 4 firms are now ‘Chinese’ or still 
 
73 In interview 6B4L p.3. 
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look for firms that have grown more directly from Chinese origins to be its domestic 
and international flag-bearers? This issue is linked to wider global concerns about the 
audit market as an oligopoly dominated by the Big 4. 
 
5.2.2 How can competition in the market be increased? 
CICPA is continuing to observe with interest the recent moves in the UK (by the 
House of Lords and the Competition and Markets Authority and its predecessors)74 
and in the EU to increase competition against the Big 4’s market dominance there.75 
But will those moves ever be successful? Many in the UK remain doubtful, e.g. 
 
I think, coming back to concentration, coming back to this issue of—I would call it the build-up 
of interest, if not frustration—of it being around for a while. We’ve done studies. We’ve heard 
lots of people say, ideally we would like to reduce concentration. I said, well, why isn’t anyone 
coming forward with any practical suggestions? Everyone’s saying, ideally, you should avoid 
excessive concentration. How can it be that no one can put forward anything of a practical 
nature to achieve it? [8PBL, p.17 (in 2011)] 
 
However the gap in China has not been as big as in the UK (and is rapidly 
narrowing—see Appendix III and Table II): 
In China, the situation is not quite as polarized as it is here. Here, for example, there’s the Big 
Four and then there’s a whopping great gap towards the likes of BDO and Grant Thornton, and 
then a significant gap to the rest of us. The gaps in China are not so great between the Big Four 
and the other top 10 players…. [12TLP p.15 (in 2011)] 
 
CICPA has specified detailed plans to be implemented during the period of the PRC’s 
latest 5-year plan (see Appendix I). All those detailed targets are consistent with the 
aim of growing sufficient numbers of large audit firms to provide services not only to 
large private companies but also to large SOEs, as was specified in ‘Document 56’ 
that MoF released in September 2009 (see Section 3.2.2).  
They may also be a stepping stone to ‘international’ audit capabilities. The Big 4 
have audited almost all the cross-listing enterprises in China for a long time, most of 
which are large SOEs that play important roles in people’s livelihood, from finance to 
 
74 Complemented by the recent independent review of the UK’s FRC 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-review-of-the-financial-reporting-council-frc-launc
hes-report (accessed 5.6.2019) and by the independent review by Sir Donald Brydon into The quality 
and effectiveness of audit 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-quality-and-effectiveness-of-audit-independent-revie
w (accessed 22.1.2020). 
75 Accountancy, December 2011, pp.68-70. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1480&format=HTML&aged=0&langu




utilities, from transport to telecommunications. The Chinese government now 
encourages the next tier of audit firms to compete for those larger clients instead of 
just for more clients, to fight for a place in the high-end market and to be recognised 
internationally. With the introduction of compulsory audit rotation for the SOEs 
controlled by central government (including the major banks)—whereby audits must 
now rotate every 5 years76—there is an opportunity for 2nd-tier network and large 
stand-alone firms to break the Big 4’s tenure. However in the first round in 2012 any 
rotation that finally took place was only between Big 4 firms.77  
So, although the Ministry of Finance wants those big companies to be audited by the local firm, 
but the local big companies don’t want to be audited by the local firms. This is the conflict in 
the situation. [16JSM p.22] 
 
Competition extends beyond auditing itself and, as noted, development of 
complementary NAS skills is also seen as a priority.  
The challenge for the 2nd–tier and stand-alone firms in China is therefore to be 
ready to level the competitive field in the next round of audit rotation in 2020 (Gillis, 
2014a: 296-7). They will need to overcome the hurdles of the continuing preference 
of CSRC for the giant Chinese financial institutions to have Big 4 auditors (to protect 
those institutions’ own international credibility); the incidence of ‘Big 4 clauses’ when 
loans are granted;78 and pressures where companies are cross-listed for them to have 
Big 4 auditors as part of the network of ‘top’ Western international lawyers, banks etc. 
that act as advisors on these deals and are looked for by international 
non-governmental agencies such as the World Bank (Suddaby et al., 2007). Future 
research will need to focus on how this plays out. 
This is not a peculiarly Chinese issue: as noted, the EU has faced the same 
difficulties in its attempts to widen audit competition.79 As two UK based 
interviewees put it:  
 
76 8 years if the auditor is ranked in the top 15 (Gillis, 2014b, p.69). 
77 http://economia.icaew.com/features/january-2014/china-leads-the-way (accessed 29.4.2017). 
78 Interviewees differed on whether such clauses (i.e. requiring borrowers to be audited by a Big 4 firm) 
exist in China. For example one 2nd-tier network firm confirmed they do [32TL p.9] while another did 
not think so [102TM p.9] as did a Big 4 firm [25BFM p. 45]. Also some pointed out that the preference 
of the major (state-owned) banks is to lend to SOEs and ‘most of them, they don’t use Big 4. Therefore 
there is no such clause.’ [24IBM p.46] The existence and nature of such clauses in the UK is hard to 
verify but they have been found to exist at least as a default option (Baylis et al., 2012) and have 
recently been banned by the EU http://ec.europa.eu/finance/auditing/reform/index_en.htm (accessed 
5.12.2014). 
79 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/reform/140903-audit-rotation-letter_en.pdf 
(accessed 2 December 2014). 
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And that’s because the people putting the money in want to see names they recognize. Now, that 
doesn’t mean the Chinese firm can’t get to that stage. But it answers your question, there is 
unarguably a need if you are going to the market and seeking funds from around the world. If 
you are going on the global market, effectively, then you’ve got to have—there’s an IBM factor.  
You’ve got to have names that people recognize involved. [4RGL p.9] 
 
Again, in relation to the ‘beauty contests’ for audit rotation:  
Ultimately, it’s the sort of chicken and egg. It would be worth someone investing and acquiring 
that knowledge if they had a realistic thought that they might actually get some work from 
having it—which, again, goes back to this ‘we’re just there to make up numbers’. If [2nd-tier 
network firms] did ever go and acquire, expensively, a lot of banking expertise…They could go 
out and buy up people who knew all this stuff…but they’re only going to do that if they think 
they’re actually going to get a bank audit… [8PBL p.44]80 
 
But can China be where the current mould is broken? Given the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy that has been witnessed recently, it would not surprise the world for 
the Chinese to also fundamentally change the structure of the international financing 
and auditing market, given that China now lends more overseas than the World Bank 
(Reich & Lebow, 2014:118).81  
There were some increasingly optimistic views from China’s 2nd-tier firms. 
Interviewed in 2011 a managing partner had said: 
 
Ten years ago both the Big Four and domestic accountancy firms we are facing different 
customers...Actually, we have separate marketing shares...In recent years the large accountancy 
firms in China like [our firm] and ShineWing they actually share the customers with Big Four 
so we are facing the same market now…In my own opinion there is a big difference between 
Big Four and [our firm] in culture and company style...The partners of domestic accountancy 
firms are much better in their own skills and experience compared to the partners in Big 
Four...But as enterprise or business we still have a huge weakness competing with Big 
Four…There is a big difference in domestic accountancy firms in internal control and staff 
training and remuneration from Big Four...In future—five years or ten I believe there will be 
domestic accountancy firms in Big Four…The Big Four have the privilege in China more than 
the domestic accountancy firms. Therefore, only from last year the domestic firms can have the 
opportunities to audit the H-shares, but still not the Red shares.82 It’s not we don’t have the 
abilities just we don’t have opportunity. [102TM p9-10; 16)]  
 
Interviewed again in 2014 he was more optimistic: 
 
80 The recent decision of Grant Thornton in the UK to stop tendering for FTSE 350 audits reflects the 
continuing preference of clients for a Big 4 firm when audits have to rotate. 
https://economia.icaew.com/news/march-2018/grant-thornton-takes-a-bow-from-audit-market 
(accessed 16.9.18). However, Mazars has now been chosen by AIG to be its UK auditor and by 
Goldman Sachs to be its auditor in Europe 
https://www.ft.com/content/d1dbfaf8-37ae-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4 (accessed 22.1.2020). 
81 On 24 October 2014 China invited participation in a new international Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (亚投行 [yà tóu háng]) although so far the US, Japan and Canada have declined to 
join, apparently fearing rivalry with the World Bank: www.aiibank.org (accessed 29.4.2017). 
82 ‘Red chips’ are the stocks of mainland China companies incorporated outside mainland China and 
listed in Hong Kong so that overseas investors can access them. The actual business is based in 
mainland China and most are controlled, either directly or indirectly, by the central, provincial or 
municipal governments of PRC. See e.g. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/redchip.asp; 




Maybe it’s less than five years. Yeah, maybe after three years, we will have opportunity in 
financial or banking fields. [262TM, p.9] 
 
So the next few years may indicate whether the firms that the government regards as 
‘Chinese’ can break the oligopoly of the Big 4 internationally. 
 
5.2.3 Relaxing the ‘control’ mentality? 
The essence of the Big 4 and increasingly the 2nd-tier network brands is that they are 
now presented as ‘stateless’ and not dominated by the firm in any one country or its 
regulators (and in this way have redefined their commercial relationships within the 
global market place (Suddaby et al., 2007)). So far the leading independent Chinese 
firms (such as Pan-China and ShineWing, and more recently Reanda), insofar as they 
have started to venture outside China and Hong Kong, have only just begun to 
generate or merge with firms in other countries. As these are increasingly ‘localized’ 
can they begin to create an ‘international’ rather than just a potentially multinational 
identity?  
Reich and Lebow (2014) observe that the pattern of Chinese overseas industrial 
investment (e.g. in Africa) has tended to be that the Chinese company exports not only 
its brand and its manufacturing technology but also its workforce and becomes a 
Chinese ‘island’ overseas.83 While it is likely that Chinese audit firms will 
increasingly follow their clients overseas they may similarly be reluctant to hand over 
control to locals there. Given that auditing and accounting services normally require 
experience in local regulation, taxation etc. this is a handicap if they cannot rely on 
alliance with a local firm.84 In the view of one senior UK practitioner with substantial 
experience of working in China this may prove to be the real stumbling block to 
creating Chinese ‘Big N’ firms.  
…the old-fashioned Chinese concept of control...[the] concept of an international firm [as] one 
controlled in Beijing…at the end of the day, that’s not a model which is going to work 
 
83 Although there are examples such as Geeley that has become the holding company of recognisably 
distinct local subsidiaries such as Volvo and the builder of London taxis. 
http://global.geely.com/history/ (accessed 19.9.18). 
84 However, ShineWing has recently extended its overseas expansion beyond Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Japan to Australia where Moore Stephens Melbourne became ShineWing Australia from 1.1.2015: 
http://www.shinewing.com.au. See also Luk (2010). It audits 16 companies listed on the Australian 
stock exchanges (ASX or SSX): 
https://www.shinewing.com.au/assets/ShineWing-Australia-Report-Audit-Transparency-2019.pdf . But 
cf. http://www.reanda-international.com/regional/en/structured.php (all accessed 9.10.19). 
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internationally because, you know, if you’re a Chinese company, maybe you’ll buy 
that...[but]…in a people business, where things are changing the whole time, you’ve got to have 
the fingers working very well, and if you have too much decided…too much control from the 
head office, without some understanding of what [is] going on in the marketplace… But they’ve 
got to build up the quality in each place, and not just the quality, but the substance, so that they 
are large enough to be credible in each of these countries where they’re operating. I mean what 
is interesting is that while America has dominated the world’s economy in the last century, there 
is no single accounting firm now, out of the Big Four, that is American. So, you know, in terms 
of the next phase, especially if China becomes the biggest economy in the world in the next five 
years, the logic of that is that it’s not going to be a Chinese firm. [20B4L pp.20-23] 
 
The global chairman of a Big 4 firm agreed. 
On the audit market structure, I think we probably do agree with the interpretation that the 
Chinese government is keen to create, if you like, national or indigenous champions, which are 
capable over time with competing with the Big Four. What is the possibility of achieving the 
goal? I mean I don’t know what the difference is between actually indigenous and the top ten, 
but I think that’s—I think that has got to be a very long-haul game, I think the prospect…There 
has not been an auditing firm that has grown from a home country base and expanded out 
internationally. All the big networks have grown through amalgamations. And it’s hard to 
envisage how a Chinese firm would do that any more than a US one. [6B4L p.1-2] 
 
So despite the speed of change in China, the general perception of the interviewees 
remains that this will not happen in the immediate future.  
From a Western perspective: 
To me, it’s all about – it’s about culture, legacy from how many of these businesses were owned 
by the state, and it’s a journey. China has got to go down that journey. And I think in truth, there 
are many in the leadership in China who understand that, but changing like that is a very 
difficult thing to do. [4RGL p33-35] 
 
5.3 Potential international consequences of the growth in the Chinese audit 
profession. 
Outside China the international ‘Western’ audit firms have themselves been 
undergoing a change in identity and in power from being primarily auditors, 
self-regulated as a profession purporting to act in the ‘public-interest’ under the eye of 
their home governments, to multi-service firms operating globally to serve large 
multinational corporate clients within a neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ (e.g. Zeff, 
2003). This process has redefined the ‘field’ of transnational regulation of 
professional services (Suddaby et al., 2007; cf. Quack and Schüßler, 2015)—and if 
China’s economic success story continues it clearly has the greatest potential of any 
country to further change the structure and strategies of the worldwide auditing 
profession.  
A London interviewee commented on the likely shift in power. 
A lot of people within our lifetime, it won’t happen for ten years, but 20, 30 years later, we 
expect to see a shift of power to the East, and I think quite easy to see [our Chinese firm] will be 
one of the biggest firms in the network, and I’m seeing already – [our firm], right now, has a 
five-year plan where we double our size in five years. And within that, actually China probably 
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will probably more like triple or quadruple in size because…we try to encourage them to grow 
because we know that China is the most important country now. We need our firm to be the 
most important firm, or one of them, in the most important economy, so it benefits the rest of 
the economy. It’s undeniable that we think China is going to be the key player in the network. 
They’re already holding lots of key positions. What we want now before some of their partners 
start sitting on the international board---we know it’s going to happen---that’s why we are 
investing so much money getting China ahead of what’s competitive and getting up to scratch, 
not necessarily making them think the way we do, because that would be wrong. [32TL, pp. 
41-42]. 
 
So future research will need to explore how international firms, that may in future be 
increasingly dominated by constituents that come from China’s ‘control’ culture and 
remain closely regulated by CICPA, MoF, and CSRC, may thereby undergo new 
changes in the relationships between their linked ecologies—their clients, competitors, 
national regulators, professional bodies, international standard setters, universities and 
other actors in a variety of international arenas—as compared to how those have been 
reshaped globally over recent years (cf. Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007; 
Gillis et al., 2014; Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2014, 2015). Noting in 2011 that 
the then (Australian) chairman of KPMG International was based in Hong Kong, and 
that the mainland Chinese firm of KPMG Huazhen would (following localization) in 
future be headed by a Chinese CPA, our senior interviewee there commented that:  
I think that maybe they [i.e. China] are aiming at something bigger. They want the international 
chair [18RGHK, p.56] 
 
So it is foreseeable that at some time in the not too distant future one or more 
international firms’ chairpersons, whether from within or from outside the current Big 
4, will be a Chinese CPA. 
In the context of the agenda for research on the future development of transnational 
accounting and auditing regulation proposed by Gillis et al. (2014), further analysis is 
therefore needed to understand in more detail both the significant background features 
of the changing Chinese environment outlined here (for example changes in the 
influence of guānxì and of other ‘Chinese characteristics’ alongside the drive to 
develop ‘world class’ universities and its potential consequences for universities 
globally)85 and to track and analyse further developments in the relationships shaping 
and shaped by the continuing rapid expansion of the Chinese profession and its 




era-of (accessed 17.6.19). 
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5.4. A new Big N firm from China? 
Reviewing the opportunities and challenges created by the rapid developments to date 
in the Chinese audit profession, and the increasing strength of the 2nd-tier and leading 
standalone firms vis-à-vis the Big 4, opens up the more speculative question of how far 
and when these developments seem likely also to create the potential for one or more 
recognizably ‘Chinese firms’ to become fully ‘international’ and create a new rival 
‘Big N’ firm or firms.86 This has long been known to be a Chinese government 
ambition. A senior UK regulator commented:  
‘What I have known for some considerable time is that there is a real desire on the part of 
the Chinese authorities to develop a Chinese global accounting player—or more….And the 
same is true in law. This is not unique to the accountancy profession.’ [4RGL p.3]  
 
 ‘International’ would mean being accepted as the auditor of Chinese companies that 
obtain overseas listings; and, at its fullest, also attracting overseas listed companies as 
clients either in China itself or by opening offices worldwide. We explored this 
question with our interviewees and, while generally positive, they clearly had 
different perceptions as to the timing and the form in which such a development could 
be possible. 
As in various other countries, and as outlined in section 3, the need to bring in 
international expertise initially led to the rapid dominance of the Big 4, more recently 
challenged by the 2nd-tier international accounting and audit networks and some 
leading stand-alone Chinese firms. In the last decade the Chinese government, with its 
‘Document 56’ vision of the creation of a superleague of 10+ Chinese accounting and 
audit firms, has increasingly promoted the indigenous accounting and audit industry to 
compete (e.g. Shi, 2013) through mergers of firms, extension of service range and 
through enabling access to the Hong Kong stock exchange (see Appendix III). It is 
clearly possible that, just as Chinese industrial and commercial firms are increasingly 
taking over in international markets, encouraged by recent government initiatives such 
as ‘Belt and Road’, the professional firms may follow their clients and, possibly by 
taking over a current international network (or even a current Big 4 firm?), launch one 
or more firms from China to join a new Big N.  
Interviewees generally agreed that achieving the government’s targets for the 
auditing industry is a more a question of time, i.e. of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’ (so future 
 
86 As predicted at an academic conference in 2010 by a former UK managing partner of PwC and 
former President of ICAEW. 
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research will need to continue to track developments). And their Chinese member 
firms will be the crucial growth area for firms everywhere. A typical comment from 
London was: 
… I think that they’ve got the vision to do it. What is very good about the Chinese government 
is they’re very consistent with what they want to do, and when they think into the long distant 
future, how they will get there by incremental small steps. So what is a realistic target to pursue, 
is very much the 10 / 200/ 7000.  [22TL p. 43] 
 
On the other hand: 
But it’s not that easy to actually raise your standard on the service industry to the same as the 
international standard because that involves people and their skills. It’s not something you can 
install overnight. It’s not something that you throw money at and you can get a result instantly. 
So, I think that’s going to be challenging. I’m not saying difficult or impossible, but it’s 
challenging. [7B4L p.33] 
 
Again there are differing areas of strength within those Chinese firms. As seen from 
London their management skills still lag behind their technical skills: 
Accounting firms are potentially very much services businesses, and people and talent 
businesses. So it’s not only about having a bunch of talent there, it’s also mostly going forward 
about how you manage. And I think what China is lacking across the whole spectrum of sectors 
is how to manage that talent…The efficiency and effectiveness is very low. You have good 
accountants, and you’ve got good people to bring in the work, how come the profitability and 
efficiency is so low? That’s management skills, which is lacking...Every country is different in 
the sense that what works elsewhere won’t work there. You can get a horse to the water, but you 
can’t make it drink. So you always need to adapt and absorb a lot of the culture and its business 
practice…We are absolutely putting China as the priority strategy globally, and we’re not 
expecting overnight miracles. [22TL p.22] (our emphasis added) 
 
And again from within China’s 2nd-tier:  
 
Because…we have big advantages in international accounting standards and accounting 
techniques...And due to it’s all the technical people who is running this firm...There’s – that’s 
why I thought we have a big difference from Big Four only in bringing all the unique strategies, 
brand name and staff training – all this kind of areas. But these areas is different from the 
technical areas. We are lacking the people who know how to actually build up our brand name 
or know how to train staff...We already realize this problem. That’s why we are doing things to 
improve these areas. [102TM p. 38] 
 
However, the longer term prognosis, as seen by a leading UK regulator, remains 
positive:  
 
I think there’s a big journey to take place in the next 10, 15 years. Will China do it in ten years?  
No. Would they have done it by 2050? I’d go to William Hill and I’d put my £100 [bet] on 
China to have done it by 2050. [4RGL pp.37-40 (in 2011)] 
 
So in this arena, as in many others, a major question that remains is how far the 
West’s (and particularly the USA’s) capacity for innovation will continue to be a 




But even as the existing dominance of the Big 4 and the international networks is 
challenged, for example through China’s adoption of ‘international’ ISAs and IFRS, 
the fact that these standards (and indeed the whole of Western accounting and auditing 
methods and practices) originate from very different business cultures (e.g. 
Faulconbridge, 2015: 443-4) will continue to pose challenges, as in other ‘transition 
economies’ that were formerly under socialist planning (e.g. Russia: Mennicken, 2008; 
2010; Samsonova, 2009; Samsonova-Taddei, 2013), as they are translated into the 
discourses and practices of daily Chinese professional and business life. 
 
My view is that…they’re not doing enough of that at the moment to get cross-secondments in 
and out and to recruit people with experience of working in the Western environment. But we’re 
trying to push them more into that. [12TL p.48] 
 
The young generation are more international in their mindset, and when they become leaders of 
the firm, that’s when we’re going to see a real shift in power. [32TL p.42] 
 
In summary, as long there remain continuing doubts internationally about the 
consequences of the expansion in Chinese firms for their perceived expertise and 
audit quality then, at least in the short run, the judgement of many of the interviewees 
is that, given the history of the development of the Chinese profession to date and the 
positions that have been built up over the last thirty years by the Big 4, supported by 
leading Chinese government officials and business personnel, the MoF / CICPA target 
for its restructuring and for development of the indigenous audit market to rival the 
current Big 4 internationally is achievable but probably over a longer timescale, and 
in a somewhat modified form, to that originally envisaged. 
A Chinese firm cannot set that up all around the world. You have to be part of a network, it 
seems to me. And I think the Ministry of Finance has now recognized that and is now instead 
wanting to make sure that if firms join an international network, they are not a junior partner, 
they can’t get controlled. But I think they misunderstood in the first place the whole question of 
control. [12TL pp.5-6] 
 
So this is what is called ‘borrow the ship to go abroad’: jiè chuán chū hǎi [借船出海]. All the 








In summary, in the context of the Government pressures to establish the reputation of 
the CICPA, to aim for the targets set out in Document 56, to internalize international 
accounting and auditing standards, and to localize the international firms, it is the 
ongoing developments in the interrelated market arenas outlined above—building 
sufficient firm strength, establishing reputation for independence, accepting potential 
audit liability, complementing improvements in auditees’ corporate governance, 
developing NAS skills, competing credibly when large audits have to rotate and 
reshaping the patterns of regulatory and organizational control—that appear to our 
interviewees most likely now to influence the prospects for non-Big 4 Chinese firms 
to gain equivalent reputational and market status to the current Big 4. Given the 
dominant size that their Chinese firms will have within their international structures 
this has in any event opened up significant questions about how these IPSFs, which 
hitherto have been Anglo-American dominated and part of the neo-liberal world order, 
may change, which will provide a key field for future research. 
 
6. Concluding comments and potential future research directions  
It is clear from the wide-ranging interviews undertaken that there is currently a variety 
of informed perceptions both inside and outside China about the current state and 
likely future development of the profession. The ongoing strategic direction from the 
government is the most significant feature, but as China’s international presence has 
been rapidly developing, enquiry needs to be focussed on the interplay between a 
range of linked ecologies across governments, markets, standard setters, regulators 
and other institutions (such as universities) that have been rapidly changing and are 
intertwined both nationally and internationally.  
It is also clear that the conventional political and academic stereotyping of firms in 
China as ‘foreign Big 4’ or ‘local’ (and globally as ‘Big 4’ versus ‘non-Big 4’) fails to 
reveal the complexities of these changing arenas within which the Chinese profession 
has been developing and that give insight into what the opportunities and barriers and 
the possible timescale for future development might be. In those interactions, the 
government strategy has been refocussed from Ding’s early ambitions at the CICPA in 
the 1990’s to create a sole Chinese ‘Big One’ (Gillis, 2014a: 184-5), and now the 
Chinese CPA-managed firms in the Big 4’s and the 2nd-tier’s international networks, 
alongside the larger stand-alone Chinese firms, all have potential roles as international 
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firms ‘with Chinese characteristics’ in changing the current landscape and ‘Western 
neo-liberal’ characteristics of IPSFs.  
Their access to Hong Kong’s international stock market to audit ‘H’ shares has 
been a significant step (see Appendix III) and the expansion of Chinese industrial and 
commercial investment overseas creates another potential avenue for firms to ‘follow 
their clients’ in the way that the UK and US firms did in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Further internationalization of SSE would create further opportunities that will need 
ongoing research. Meanwhile China has expanded its government’s international roles 
and consolidated its relations with Western professional accounting bodies and its 
input to the global standard setting institutions (see Appendix II).  
Although some institutional barriers mainly reflect the legacy of the pre-1978 era 
in the initial stages of the emergence of China’s ‘socialist market economy’, these 
may now increasingly be being overcome as the next generation takes over (in many 
arenas with the aid of strong, resource-intensive government support). But building 
the international reputation of Brand China in the audit sphere—in particular in 
international capital markets—may still prove harder than in other arenas such as 
manufacturing and civil and electronic engineering. Nevertheless the central issue 
now seems to be how fast will be the pace of change that can take the audit firms in 
China on from becoming the biggest in the world (which given the still increasing size 
of the domestic market seems almost certain) to becoming multinational and/or 
international and to being seen as standing on a par with the existing international 
firms. As a London interviewee observed: ‘China is probably the only economy in the 
world where this is possible.’ [22TL p.4]  
However, the story may not be straightforward. More circumspect views may 
remember that about 40 years ago there was a widespread expectation that the 
Japanese management approach would displace US economic dominance. Brandt et 
al. (2014) conclude their historical survey of China’s institutions with the caution 
(p.112): ‘With the aid of hindsight, we can see that pessimistic predictions [about 
China] of the 1990s failed to comprehend China’s dynamic potential. While striving 
to avoid this error, we must also recognize that, as is painfully evident from Japan’s 
recent history, past success cannot guarantee the future efficacy of institutional 





6.1 Towards a future research agenda 
This initial exploration of a variety of expert understandings opens up a range of 
research questions for continuing exploration.   
With regard to the current developments in auditing in China, exploration of expert 
perceptions and reactions in the US, the EU and Australia to complement those 
reported here would also be valuable. Significant issues for further research 
investigation include both deeper historical understanding of the developments to date 
within China (for example Wen et al., 2018 have recently had access to the internal 
CICPA document archive) and analysis of emerging data about Chinese audit firms’ 
behaviour (e.g. Capalbo et al., 2014; Ke et al., 2015; He et al., 2017; DeFond, 2018). 
If access for in-depth field observations, similar to those of Mennicken (2008; 2010) 
and Samsanova (2013) in Russia, could be obtained that would be especially 
illuminating, particularly as to the varied impact of differing national cultures and 
institutions on the operation of auditing standards in practice.  
The ongoing consequences of the localization of the Big 4 required by 2017 and 
the outcome of the mandated 2020 audit rotations require analysis, as will any 
extensions of the licensing to audit Hong Kong listed firms and increasing 
internationalisation of SSE, alongside the continuing expansion of Chinese clients’ 
overseas investment and M&A. Similarly, the impacts of any further mergers among 
the 2nd-tier and independent firms on the international networks and their global 
positioning need following. Deeper understanding of the organisational structures of 
audit firms, in China and worldwide, and of how their varying forms of glocalization 
are influenced by the rapidly growing significance of their Chinese member firms is 
still needed (cf. Boussebaa & Morgan, 2015). Given the dominant size that their 
Chinese firms may gain within their international structures this has opened up 
significant questions about how these IPSFs, which hitherto have been 
Anglo-American dominated and part of the neo-liberal world order, may change, 
which will provide a key field for future research of wide interest. 
In the context of the agenda for research on the future development of transnational 
accounting and auditing regulation proposed by Gillis et al. (2014), further analysis is 
therefore needed to understand in more detail the significant background features of 
the changing Chinese environment outlined here (for example changes in the 
influence of guānxì and of other Chinese cultural characteristics, such as the ‘control’ 
mentality, discussed in Section 4 above) as markets widen domestically and 
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internationally and as there are potential intergenerational changes in the mindsets of 
crucial actors, as well as to track and analyse further developments in the various 
linked ecologies where multiple and shifting strategies and agendas are shaping and 
shaped by the continuing rapid expansion of the Chinese profession and its firms.  
Research into changes in audit technology such as those emerging from growth in 
Big Data and AI may also be especially impacted by the scale of the related Chinese 
markets within the global structure (cf. Salijeni et al., 2019; ICAEW, 2017).  
Other Chinese institutional changes that require ongoing research and examination 
of their consequences include potential consolidation and reshaping of regulatory 
structures and processes, nationally and internationally; expanding Chinese 
contribution to the bodies developing international accounting and auditing standards; 
potential imposition of stricter audit liability; consequences of development of NAS; 
and interactions between audit and the further embedding of corporate governance 
regimes in both SOEs (national and provincial) and private client companies. 
This study’s initial exploration has opened up some of the important linkages that 
have emerged in China and that merit continuing empirical investigation by audit 
researchers in what will continue to be a rapidly changing domestic and global 
environment. It will be often neessary for Western and Chinese researchers to work 
collaboratively to enhance mutual understanding of differing perspectives. Moreover 
the rapid rise of the ‘China-phenomenon’ may now require further academic 
rethinking of the theoretical categories that have been developed for understanding 
international development of IPSFs—for example in the ‘ecological-institutional’ 
theory (Suddaby and Muzio, 2015) drawn on here or in the analysis of ‘institutional 
logics’ (e.g. Micelotta et al., 2017)—and even the building of new analytical 
frameworks. Further theoretical development is needed of how, in the management 
and related auditing spheres, the framework of ‘governmentality’—that has been 
constructed for ‘Western’ neoliberal economies largely on the basis of Foucault’s 
(1977) work (cf. Hoskin, 2017), and that observes the promotion of ‘programmes’ 
through a range of calculative and other technologies that engender self-regulated 
‘action at a distance’ (e.g. Miller & Rose, 2008; Power, 1997)—can be interpreted 
within China’s more autocratic political system and culture to illuminate 
understanding of how the various economic actors and institutions coming from 
within that system, including its new young ‘graduate professionals’, will now 
(re)construct their identity within China and internationally (e.g. Hoffman, 2006; 
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Sigley, 2006; cf. Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005; Detzen et al., 2017).87 
In summary, even though it may appear quite surprising to ‘Western’ eyes that have 
become accustomed to the neoliberal world order and the Washington consensus that 
underpins the current international dominance of the Big 4, the firms in China remain 
subject, to probably an almost unique degree, to direction by a government that has a 
vision and a strategic plan for the role it wants them to play domestically and 
internationally (whether as members of the Big 4 or of second-tier networks, or as 
stand-alone firms). There are no such government strategies for the profession in the 
US or UK. Given the sheer size of the firms in China (again almost unique and which is 
still rapidly growing) it seems inevitable that this will alter the balance of the structure, 
management and culture of the current leading firms worldwide and may also alter the 
structure and processes of international regulation and standard setting. And there is 
also the government’s longstanding aim for a recognisably ‘Chinese’ firm or firms to 
join the current international leaders.  
However, the path the Chinese government is pursuing has to navigate the linked 
ecologies that it tries to influence but that in turn reshape it. These include, inter alia, 
developments in domestic and international markets, developments in domestic and 
international stock exchanges and other arenas of financial infrastructure, 
developments in transnational regulation and in varying third-party liability regimes, 
developments in links with universities and other professional bodies, and ongoing 
changes in IPSFs’ strategies as well as contested agendas within the government itself. 
For researchers this means that, on China’s present trajectory, work (such as that 
outlined here) that deepens understanding of auditing in China will be ever more 
significant for understanding the ways in which the global profession and global 
standards are reshaped, as well as for making meaningful comparisons and contrasts 
with developments in other countries. 
 
87 Contrast, Carter et al. (2015) who, in ‘scoping an agenda for future research into the professions’ 
only give a one-line recommendation (in relation to globalisation) to pursue comparative research 
‘outside of the “West” ’(p.1207). In their recent review of organizational research and their proposed 
integrative research agenda focussed on ‘institutional logics’ Micelotta et al. (2017) fail to include the 
rapid and transformational changes taking place in China and their potential global impact. 
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Appendix I: China’s 12th ‘5-year’ plan 
From a speech by the Deputy President & Secretary General of CICPA Dr. Chen 
Yugui, 22 Oct 2012: ‘CICPA enacted and promulgated the Development Plan for the 
Chinese Accountancy Profession (2011-2015), presenting the development objectives 
for the profession in the 12th Five-Year period, including but not limited to the 
following: 
1.Double the profession-wide revenue in five years; 
2.Train 350 leading talents, 600 internationally recognized CPAs and 5,000 new key 
practitioners, grow the number of practicing CPAs to 120,000; 
3.Develop 10 world-class firms, at least three [of] which will rank among the world's 
top 20 firms, foster 200 medium-sized firms and develop a number of small firms in 
line with the regulatory requirements. 
To achieve these goals, we are working on the current priorities as follows: 
1. Focus on developing non-auditing services; 
2. Train professionals with variety of expertise; 
3. Enhance policy support and long term brand building strategies to build 
stronger and bigger firms; 
4. Accelerate accounting information technology development in all levels of the 
profession; 
5. Broaden efforts in international exchanges and collaborations.’  
 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201210/t20121029_38000.html (accessed 7.7.16). 
 
An update on the 13th plan (2016-20) and CICPA’s related strategy is reported at 
http://www.gaaaccounting.com/a-year-of-going-global-for-cicpa/ The plan includes: 
Advancing exploration of international market 
Accounting firms are encouraged to join international networks to make a greater international 
impact by participating in governance and decision-making processes. International service 
capabilities of accounting firms should be improved by making use of the technology, 
management skills and market resources in the international networks. Accounting firms are 
encouraged to establish their own international networks. 
The international market for the accounting sector should be actively explored to support the 
“going global” of Chinese companies and capitals and “One Belt and One Road” initiative. 
International service programs, such as technical assistance of international financial institutions, 





Appendix II:  
a) CICPA officials 
The immediate former President of CICPA, Li Yong,88 is also Vice Minister of MoF 
http://www.theiirc.org/?p=2766 (accessed 10.11.14)  
 
The Deputy-President and Secretary General of CICPA, Dr. Chen Yugui, is also the 
Executive Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of China’s [CPC] Committee of 
China CPA Profession  
http://www.pccpa.cn/EN/gsdtNewsen.aspx?ID=320&Type=gsdt (accessed 20.7.14).  
 
As its website states, CICPA remains ‘under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Council’.89 
 
b) International representation 
The IASB’s first Chinese Board Member, Dr. Zhang Wei-Guo, joined in July 2007: 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/Members+of+the+IASB/Zhang+Wei-Guo.htm 
and was reappointed for a second term in January 2012. He was formerly a Professor 
and the Head of the Accounting Department at SUFE; a member of the China 
Accounting Standards Committee and the China Auditing Standards Committee; and 
then Chief Accountant and Director General of the Department of International 
Affairs at the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).90  
 
A Chinese practitioner, Dr. Tang Jianhua (who is Director, Professional Standards 
Division, CICPA) is a member of IAASB http://www.ifac.org/bio/jianhua-tang. 
 
Li Yong, the then President of CICPA and also Vice Minister of MoF, was appointed 
a Trustee of the IFRS Foundation in January 2012: 
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/PressRelease/new+trustees+jan+2012.htm 91 
 
Yang Min (Director General of the Accounting Regulatory Dept, MoF), Wang Haoyu 
(of CSRC) and Prof. Huang Shizhong (Vice President and Professor, Xiamen 
National Accounting Institute) are members of the IFRS Advisory Council: 
http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Advisory-Council/IFRS-Advisory-Council-memb
ership/Pages/IFRS-Advisory-Council-membership.aspx [all sites accessed 5.12.2014]. 
 
 
88 Succeeded by Feng Shuping (a former Assistant Minister of Finance) from October 2014: 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/leaders/xhldcy/201410/t20141028_46007.html (accessed 6.1.15). See 
http://www.gaaaccounting.com/a-year-of-going-global-for-cicpa/ (accessed 19.9.18). 
89 http://www.cicpa.org.cn/introcicpa/about/201407/t20140708_45449.html (accessed 14.2.20). 
90 Following Dr. Zhang’s retirement Dr Lu Jianqiao was appointed a member of the IASB from 1 
August 2017. Previously he was Director of the Accounting Regulatory Department of the MoF and in 
charge of Chinese accounting standard-setting. 
https://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrsf/iasb-ifrs-ic/iasb-history#lu (accessed 24.8.2017). 
91 More recently IASB announced the appointment as a Trustee of the IFRS Foundation of Zhu 
Guangyao, who has been Vice Finance Minister in charge of the Customs Tariff Department and key 
international connections at MoF since 2010. He is also Chairman of the Accounting Society of China. 
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Governance/Pages/trustees-appointments.aspx [accessed 13.3.2017]. 
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1 PwC China 3351.41 959 6053 YES 
 普华永道会计师事务所    pǔhuá yǒngdào kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
2 Deloitte China 2881.23 800 5686 YES 
 德勤华永会计师事务所    déqín huáyǒng kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
3 Ruihua CPAs 2775.93 2335 7887 YES 
 瑞华会计师事务所        ruìhuá kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
4 BDO China Shu Lun Pan CPAs 2509.11 1811 7244 YES 
 立信会计师事务所        lìxìn kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
5 Ernst & Young China 2364.34 911 4464 YES 
 安永华明会计师事务所    ānyǒng huámíng kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
6 KPMG Huazhen 2347.17 616 3454 YES 
 毕马威华振会计师事务所  bìmǎwēi huázhèn kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
7 Pan-China CPAs 1341.46 1389 3839 YES 
 天健会计师事务所        tiānjiàn kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
8 Da Hua CPAs 1237.88 976 4113 YES 
 大华会计师事务所        dàhuá kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ95 
9 ShineWing CPAs 1175.17 1096 3783 YES 
 信永中和会计师事务所    xìnyǒngzhōnghé kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
10 PKF Daxin CPAs 1100.55 1032 3400 YES 
 大信会计师事务所        dàxìn kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
11 Baker Tilly China 1029.16 747 2674 NO 
 天职国际会计师事务所    tiānzhí guójì kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
12 Grant Thornton China 795.83 744 2412 YES 
 致同会计师事务所        zhìtóng kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
 
 
92 Source: CICPA http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/201405/t20140530_45055.html (in Chinese 30 May 
2014); http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201406/W020140630412948909614.pdf (in English 26 June 
2014) (both accessed 18 November 2014). 
93 1 million Chinese yuan (RMB) approx. = £111,000 or US$145,000 (https://www.xe.com/ accessed 
18 September 2018). 
94 Source: Hong Kong FRC, November 2011. NB to be licensed, mainland firms must, inter alia, have 
a Hong Kong affiliate. [18RGHK] 
95 Initiated by SUFE and formerly linked with Ernst & Young and then with BDO [16JSM p.3] and 
now a member of Moore Stephens International network, branded on its website as Moore Stephens Da 
Hua CPAs (Chinese name: 大华(马施云)国际会计师事务所 dàhuá (mǎshīyún) guójì kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ 
[literal English trans: Da Hua (Mashiyun) international accounting firm]) 
http://www.moorestephens.com/FirmProfile.aspx?ID=1B517E6CFD25612ECD1A531F907A0342 
Moore Stephens International also has another Chinese member firm Beijing Xinghua CPAs (Chinese 
name: 北京兴华会计师事务所 běijīng xìnghuá kuàijìshī shìwùsuǒ) which is ranked #17 
http://www.moorestephens.com/FirmProfile.aspx?ID=F554601E655FF95C260207AAD31032E1   
(both accessed 18.11.14) 
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Appendix IV: Research approach 
Like Carter & Spence (2014) and Ezzamel & Xiao (2015), and guided inter alia by 
Malsch & Salterio (2016), this study has primarily pursued a qualitative approach to 
investigate the nuances and complexities of the developments in the Chinese audit 
profession and their international ramifications.  
This study relies primarily on complementing existing literature (both official and 
academic) with 23 semi-structured interviews, together with 7 more informal 
lunch/tea/dinner conversations in China, to gain insights from leading actors.96 19 of 
these 30 meetings took place in 2011. Initially 8 were in London during June and July 
2011 with senior partners and senior managers responsible for the links between the 
UK and Chinese offices of leading international networks of accounting and audit 
firms, some of whom were themselves Chinese and/or had worked in China (two Big 
4 firms—including the global chairman of one of them; four 2nd-tier firms); and with 
senior representatives of one professional accountancy institute (ICAEW) and of the 
UK’s Auditing Practices Board (APB). In mainland China and Hong Kong in 
November 2011 11 interviews and other meetings were held with senior accountants, 
regulators and academics there (including senior Chinese partners of two Big 4 firms 
and one 2nd-tier international network; current or former senior representatives of 
CICPA, CSRC and the Hong Kong Financial Reporting Council (FRC); and four 
senior professors of accounting (focussing particularly on their external roles both in 
standard setting and regulatory processes and/or as non-executive directors and audit 
committee chairmen of listed companies)).  
A further 11 interviews/conversations were variously undertaken in Beijing in 
April 2012, in London in July 2012, in Hangzhou and Beijing in September 2013 and 
in Beijing in July 2014 and April 2015. The informal conversations in China included 
the head of a professional accountancy institute there (ICAEW); a representative of 
the investment banking arm of a securities firm specialising in domestic IPOs; and 
two senior professors. The final two interviews (in 2014) and final two conversations 
(in 2015) involved revisiting some of those earlier contacts to follow up on the 
consequences of the 2012 ‘watershed’ that required more rapid ‘localization’ of the 
Big 4 (see Section 3.3) and of the resumption of domestic IPOs that had been 
suspended since October 2012 and also added an interview with a senior former 
representative of China Investment Corporation (China’s sovereign wealth fund).  
 
96 Other background information was gleaned in China from news media and networking events etc.. 
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Interviews in mainland China were facilitated by a former chief accountant of 
CSRC who had subsequently joined the Board of IASB and through other 
experienced contacts in China. Interviewees were accumulated partly by ‘snowballing’ 
(i.e. following up contacts recommended / introduced by other interviewees). The set 
of interviews was regarded as sufficient once ‘saturation’ was experienced, i.e. despite 
the barriers to gaining access within China97 there was considered to be sufficient 
representation of the variety of relevant perspectives as views were increasingly 
repeated by new interviewees.98 
Several interviewees had been involved in the creation of firms and of the Chinese 
profession, and in the related developments within universities, since the end of the 
1966-1976 Cultural Revolution and the start of the Reform and Opening up in 1978, 
and brought their own ‘lived experiences’ to their interpretation of the trajectory of 
development. Others had consulted their firms’ local China experts in preparing for 
the interviews in order to be able to give the most reliable current information.  
Several interviewees occupied or had occupied multiple senior roles but they have 
been classified here by what seemed to be their most prominent relevant role for the 
purposes of this study. Table I gives a summary and how interviewees’ roles have 
been coded.  
 





97 We could not obtain an interview with Dr Zhang Ke, head of ShineWing, but there have been 
several published interviews and commentaries about him and his firm (e.g. Luk, 2010) (and we did 
have access to a senior representative of the other leading, and larger, stand-alone firm, Pan China 
(tiānjiàn[天健])). While we gained access at the top of CICPA, some supporting data that we asked for 
was withheld on the grounds that it would breach Chinese law to show it to a foreigner. And we were 
unable to gain access to anyone senior in MoF itself. 
98 Interviews in the UK and Hong Kong were facilitated through personal contacts gained during this 
author’s (an ICAEW Chartered Accountant) nearly 50 years experience of working with senior 
members of the accounting profession. 
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Table I. Breakdown of 30 interviews/conversations 
Interviewees 
Location and Interview # 
London # Mainland China # Hong Kong # 
L  M  HK  
Audit 
firms  
Big 4 B4 √ 6,7,20 √ 11, 12, 25   
2nd tier 2T √ 1,2,3,5 √ 10, 26   
Independent IF   √ 22   
Professional bodies PB √ 8 √ 9, 23   
Inv Bank/Fund IB   √ 19, 24, 30   
Regulators RG √ 4 √ 14 √ 17,18 
Professors99 JS   √ 




Note: Interviews quoted from in the text are coded as in the following examples: Interview #3 (with 
2nd-tier audit firm in London): 32TL; Interview #15 (with accounting professor in Mainland China): 
15JSM; Interview #18 (with regulator in Hong Kong): 18RGHK  
 
The interviews generally lasted between 1½ and 2½ hours and were semistructured, 
taking the form of ‘guided conversations’ where questions were modified and 
developed as appropriate to match the career histories and responsibilities of the 
individual interviewees and in the light of knowledge gained from earlier interviews 
(e.g. Horton et al., 2004). Interviewees received a copy of the outline questions in 
advance and a Chinese translation of the questionnaire was also provided to Chinese 
interviewees.100 The structure was modified for the 2014 interviews to take account of 
the 2012 watershed on localization requirements (see Section 3.3) and changes in the 
leaderboard of firms’ size rankings in China.101 However, it remained more of an 
aide-memoire and a series of prompts to encourage interviewees to talk about their 
experience of and reactions to the various aspects of the changes that have occurred, 
and their likely unfolding consequences, in particular in relation to the various 
government initiatives highlighted. Interviewees frequently departed from the order of 
our questions as they told their own story. The quotations given show how the 
interviewees were primarily commenting on their own experiences and how these had 
shaped their opinions. 
 
99 Most of these professors also acted as audit committee chairmen and several had been involved in 
Chinese standards development and regulatory bodies. 
100 Copies of the most recent (2014) version in English and Chinese are available on request from the 
author. 
101 See Appendix III and Tables II.1-5. The CICPA has published annual rankings of the top 100 firms: 
http://www.cicpa.org.cn/BNIE/201806/t20180612_50996.html (accessed 17.6.2019).  
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The interviews (but not the more informal conversations) were nearly all 
undertaken with the assistance of the Chinese member of the research team102 and 
were recorded, professionally transcribed, listened to by both interviewers to check 
the transcription and, in several cases and especially where requested, returned to the 
interviewees for checking (particularly with regard to what was ‘off the record’). 
Where interviewees preferred to answer in Chinese either they had arranged for an 
interpreter (whose version we generally relied on) or occasionally the Chinese 
member of the interview team directly interpreted the Chinese transcript for 
subsequent analysis. Where Chinese interviewees used English the selected quotations 
report their words as spoken and we have not attempted to ‘polish’ their English style 
and grammar provided the meaning is clear. Each transcript (from all locations) was 
read through several times by each member of the interview team and then discussed 
jointly to identify the salient themes, making due allowance for individuals’ 
sometimes (self-)contradictory views and how opinions were not always 
straightforwardly black or white but covered shades of grey (e.g. Horton et al., 2004). 
This process was repeated until the two of us came to a consensus on how the data 
should be best interpreted and presented to contribute to our theoretical understanding, 
and on which were the most illuminating quotations to select (e.g. Klag and Langley, 
2013). 
Interviewees regarded some of the issues discussed as particularly sensitive, or 
simply did not want to be identifiable, so were assured of confidentiality. Therefore it 
can reasonably be assumed that they have generally spoken openly and freely, 
especially as one of the interview team was Chinese. There are of course no direct 
quotations from any of their ‘off the record’ comments but the development of the 
paper has made use of these, together with other information and insights learned 
from the interviews and conversations as well as from public sources (both in English 
and Chinese), in developing its general interpretations.  
The main focus was on the nature of the relationships between the UK (and 
international) offices of firms and their rapidly expanding counterparts in China, and 
explored interviewees’ understanding of the prospects for the strategy set out in 
‘Document 56’ issued by MoF in 2009 which set out its targets for the international 
and domestic roles of different tiers of firms; of the likely consequences of granting 
 




‘H’ share licenses in 2011 to (initially) 12 leading mainland firms to audit companies 
listed in Hong Kong (see Appendix III); and, for the interviews in 2013 and 2014, of 
the consequences of the new localization requirements for the Big 4 issued in 2012 
(see Section 3.3).  
The basic framework of the questionnaires was based on background reading and 
some prior quantitative research (Deng, 2011) and they were gradually modified in 
the light of the insights gained during the interview process and its iterations. This 
gradually enabled the paper to build a variegated picture of the important linked 
ecologies and how these worlds are connected, drawing on the approach to analyzing 
institutional changes in IPSFs outlined in Section 2 above. Nevertheless a warning 
from one of the most senior and influential Chinese interviewees must be kept in 
mind: 
Well, I don’t think that you’ve omitted any sort of important issues, but I think something 
difficult—if you have no overall understanding of the Chinese system and so on—and so 
lots of things you have the reasons behind, you know, there’s kind of a connection with, you 
know, other part of—therefore, I think such kind of interview really meaningful, but it’s 
still not easy for you to have a full picture—you know, deep understanding.’ (24IBM p.85) 
 
This study is therefore largely exploratory and there will be ongoing opportunities for 
further more detailed research into the issues and questions addressed and into their 




TABLE II Statistics on largest audit firms in China 
Source: WIND Database 19.6.2018 (http://www.wind.com.cn/en/aboutus.html)  
Note: 1 million Chinese yuan (RMB) approx. = £111,000 or US$145,000 (https://www.xe.com/ 
accessed 18 September 2018). 
 
Table II.1 Audit fees from Chinese listed companies in 2017 
 Audit Fees (million RMB) Rank 
PwC 786 1 
BDO 687 2 
EY 508 3 
Tian Jian (=Pan-China) 440 4 
Rui Hua 400 5 
KPMG 360 6 
Deloitte 259 7 
ShineWing 229 8 
Zhi Tong (= GRANT THORNTON) 229 9 
Da Hua 214 10 
 
Table II.2 Total assets audited of Chinese listed companies in 2017  
Assets Audited (billion RMB) Rank 
PwC 83,396 1 
KPMG 41,735 2 
EY 36,565 3 
Deloitte 21,825 4 
BDO 8,237 5 
Rui Hua 5,237 6 
ShineWing 3,801 7 
Tian Jian 3,276 8 
Zhi Tong 2,761 9 
Da Hua 2,091 10 
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Table II.3 Chinese listed clients’ numbers in 2017 
 Clients’ Number Rank 
BDO 580 1 
Tian Jian 397 2 
Rui Hua 339 3 
Da Hua 227 4 
ShineWing 218 5 
Zhi Tong 180 6 
Da Xin (=PKF) 135 7 
Zhong Shen Zhong Huan103  124 8 
Tian Zhi Guo Ji  (= BAKER TILLY) 119 9 
Hua Pu Tian Jian104 111 10 
… … … 
PwC 68 12 
EY 64 14 
Deloitte 59 16 
KPMG 28 31 
 
Table II.4 Chinese domestic IPO assets audited since 1999105 
 Assets Audited (Billion RMB) Rank 
KPMG 13,868 1 
Deloitte 13,430 2 
EY 10,497 3 
PwC 9,189 4 
BDO 1,538 5 
Tian Jian 1,450 6 
Fujian Hua Xing 911 7 
Rui Hua 747 8 
ShineWing 662 9 
Li An Da106 455 10 
 
 
103 Member of Mazars. 
104 Member of Kreston International network. 
105 Because there have been many mergers among audit firms throughout the 19 years, as well as many 
complicated name changes, and due to other technical problems, there might be some omissions in this 
data. However, the overall picture that the Big 4 audited much larger customers than other firms is 
clear. 
106 Member of Reanda International network. 
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Table II.5 Chinese domestic IPO clients numbers since 1999107  
Clients Number Rank 
BDO 372 1 
Tian Jian 272 2 
Rui Hua 201 3 
Da Hua 130 4 
ShineWing 121 5 
Hua Pu Tian Jian 98 6 
Zhi Tong 95 7 
Zheng Zhong Zhu Jiang108 89 8 
Da Xin 70 9 
Peng Cheng109 66 10 
… … … 
EY 44 14 
PwC 43 16 
Deloitte 21 27 




107 See again footnote 105. The overall picture that the 2nd-tier network firms and other local firms 
have greater involvement in domestic IPO activity than the Big 4 is clear. 
108 Members of HLB International. 




ASBE  Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (PRC) 
CICA   China Institute of Certified Auditors (merged into CICPA in 1995) 
CICPA  Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
CNAO   China’s National Audit Office  
CPA   Certified Public Accountant (PRC) 
CPC  Communist Party of China [zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng (中国共产党)] 
CSRC  China Securities Regulatory Commission (reports to Premier of PRC) 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FRC   Financial Reporting Council (Hong Kong) 
HKICPA  Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
IAASB  International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IFAC) 
IPSF  International Professional Services Firm 
JV   Joint Venture 
LLP  Limited Liability Partnership 
MoF  Ministry of Finance (PRC) 
PCAOB  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (US) 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council [guózīwěi (国资委)] (PRC) 
 
SEC   Securities and Exchange Commission (US) 
SGP  Special General Partnership [tèshū pǔtōng héhuǒ (特殊普通合伙)] (PRC) 
SOE  State-owned enterprise (national or provincial) (PRC) 
SSE  Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SUFE  Shanghai University of Finance and Economics 
WTO  World Trade Organization
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